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ABSTRACT
This thesis describes the generation and use of program invariants to improve
software reliability. It introduces PRECIS, a technique for automatic invari-
ant generation based on program path guided clustering. The invariants
generated by PRECIS can be directly used by programmers for regression
testing and improved code documentation. The generated invariants can also
be used as part of hardware error detectors, by checking variables key to pro-
gram output. PREAMBL, a bug localization technique, is introduced as a
way of providing increased utility to the generated invariants in diagnosing
post-release bugs.
The benefits of these uses of the generated invariants are shown through ex-
periments. The high control-flow coverage of generated invariants is demon-
strated for the Siemens benchmark suite, and higher quality is indicated
when compared with Daikon, a prior technique. Fault injection experiments
show high error detection coverage for several types of manifested errors.
Results for PREAMBL show higher scoring for localized paths than previous
approaches.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Developing programs that work as intended and keeping them that way after
numerous changes are two of the most fundamental goals of software engi-
neering. Despite this, the goal of “bug-free” software remains as elusive as
ever. As software grows in both complexity and importance, from manag-
ing the national power grid to running implanted pacemakers, the ability to
validate that software works as expected is critical.
1.1 Software Development
The modern software development process is divided into roughly four parts:
design, implementation, verification, and operation and maintenance. A di-
agram showing the typical software development life cycle (SDLC) is shown
in Figure 1.1.
The design stage involves writing formal or informal specifications for how
the software is intended to work. This typically includes a functional re-
quirements document, a high-level design document, and a UI document.
Depending on the project, a specification of the behavior in a formal model-
ing language may also be written during this stage.
The following stage is implementation. In this stage the code which runs
the software is written. In the case of new software, the code may be started
from scratch. The code may also be modified from an existing codebase,
if the product is a new version of existing software. Very basic testing is
done during this stage to ensure that existing functionality does not break
(regression testing).
Once the software is feature complete the third stage, verification, begins.
During this stage the software is tested using a variety of techniques to ensure
that it behaves according to the specifications defined in the design stage.
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Verification is often the most difficult stage in terms of time and resources;
it is common for software to spend more time in verification than the first
two stages combined.
The final stage of the software development life cycle is operation and
maintenance. This stage involves the end-user’s use of the software, as well as
maintenance required to keep the software functional in the face of a changing
environment and use cases. Regression tests are also very important during
maintenance; existing functionality can fail when the execution environment
changes, such as after an operating system update.
Design 
Implementation Verification 
     Operation 
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Figure 1.1: A diagram showing a typical software development life cycle
(SDLC).
1.2 Software Verification
Of all the stages in the SDLC, verification continues to be the most time-
consuming and the most difficult. The research field of software verification
is as old as software itself. Roughly speaking, techniques can be divided
into two categories. Static techniques involve the analysis of program code,
such as in formal verification and source code analysis. Dynamic techniques
involve the analysis of a program’s runtime state, such as in unit testing,
invariant generation, and bug localization.
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Formal verification techniques analyze program source code to construct
a model of program behavior. This model can be used to verify that the
program obeys a previously defined formal specification, through a process
called model-checking. Formal verification tools have been used to ensure
functional correctness [1, 2, 3]. While formal verification tools can provide a
provable guarantee that a program adheres to a specification, they suffer from
the path-explosion problem. The path-explosion problem reflects the fact that
as programs get larger, the number of possible paths grows exponentially.
Since formal tools must represent each such path in the constructed model,
this means the time and memory requirements for analysis quickly become
untenable. Thus, even the most advanced formal model-checking tools have
considerable scalability issues.
Source code analysis is another form of static analysis. However, instead
of using program text to build a model, the program text itself is checked to
adhere to various constructs. Industry tools such as Coverity and HP Fortify
[4, 5] use source-level analysis to check for code conventions and language-
level “rules” such as: “For each open() call in a function there must be a
corresponding close() call.” Research tools such as PR-Miner have extended
that approach to automatically discover such rules and check the program for
them [6, 7, 8]. While source code analysis is considerably lighter-weight and
more efficient than model-checking tools, it is limited in its ability to verify
program correctness, since it does not construct a model of the program or
monitor its execution.
Of the dynamic techniques to software verification, manual testing is per-
haps the oldest and most basic. Manual testing involves hand writing test
cases for a program, running them on the code, and verifying that the out-
put is correct. Despite this simplicity, there are many different scopes of
manual testing. Unit testing has the smallest scope; a single function or
class is tested independently. Integration testing involves testing the inter-
face between several units linked together. System testing involves testing
the entire program or application. Manual testing has several advantages: it
is intuitive and easy to verify whether the program works correctly for the
tested cases. However, manual testing requires human effort proportional to
the amount of testing required, and it is usually impractical or impossible to
perform enough tests to verify the entire input space.
To address these concerns, automated testing is an active area of research.
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Traditional automated testing has used fuzzing, that is, random generation of
test inputs [9]. More recent work has been done in the field of concolic testing
[10, 11, 12, 13]. Concolic testing involves executing a program with a given
input, while tracking the path condition for that input. This means that
at the end of each execution a concolic tool will have a Boolean expression
which evaluates to true if and only if the input follows the same path through
all control flow as the given execution. Through multiple executions with
inversions of terms in the path condition, test cases can be generated which
cover more program functionality than fuzz testing. However, given large
programs it can still be impractical or impossible to cover all unique paths,
given their exponential growth.
Automatic invariant generation has been an important goal toward in-
creasing confidence of programs for many decades. Recent techniques, such
as Daikon and DIDUCE, observe dynamic data from program runs and infer
statistically relevant relationships [14, 15, 16]. Some recent techniques use
symbolic execution to infer invariants [17, 18].
Inevitably bugs will escape detection until after a program is released.
Automated bug localization tools use a dynamic statistical analysis of cap-
tured program state to determine where a bug likely is. Recent tools such as
CBI and HOLMES capture predicate and path information and calculate a
score representing the association of a given predicate or path with the bug
[19, 20, 21].
1.3 Software Verification in Industry
Despite the breadth and depth of research, industry practice for the verifica-
tion of program correctness generally remains limited to manual testing.
Model checking techniques are used extensively in certain safety-critical
applications, such as in the aerospace industries and for medical devices, but
widespread adoption is very low. This is due to the large cost in time and
resources required to maintain formal specifications for each program, and
because model checking techniques suffer from computational capacity issues
for even moderately sized programs due to their attempt to enumerate all
possible executions.
Several source code analysis tools have adoption in industry, such as HP
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Fortify and Coverity, though their use is generally limited to enforcing code
conventions and identifying the most obvious language misuse, as they are
not powerful enough to identify bugs in functionality.
Simple bug localization techniques have been used in production code for
decades. For example, Microsoft has integrated a crash reporter into its
operating systems since Windows XP [22]. However, modern crash reports
tend to be simplistic: they contain information such as the stack trace at
program failure, version of software, and hardware. This information is often
difficult to use to localize the root cause of a bug.
Invariant generation tools have also not seen widespread adoption in in-
dustry, as static tools do not have the scalability required, and dynamic tools
often generate spurious, low-quality invariants.
1.4 Approach
This thesis proposes an alternative paradigm of software verification that ad-
dresses many of the issues preventing existing research from gaining widespread
adoption in the software industry. Specifically, it describes and explores the
idea of combining the paradigms of static and dynamic analysis through the
capture of statically captured program path structure and dynamically in-
strumented program state. This white-box, incremental approach to software
verification works well for several reasons:
• Software usually exists in an “almost-correct” state. Rarely in the
software development process is a program so incorrect that it never
produces the correct answer. Manual testing, which is well-practiced
by virtually all software developers, makes it easy to determine whether
a program works correctly for the common case. It is the uncommon
cases, however, where most time and effort is spent to identify and fix
bugs. This means that relying a program’s typical behavior provides a
good insight into how the program should behave.
• Program text implicitly describes expectations. Formal verification of
independently defined program specifications is perhaps one of the most
ironclad ways of ensuring software works as intended under all circum-
stances. Yet industry use of formal methods is limited to very specific
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applications, such as aerospace software and medical device controllers.
In other words, circumstances where the need for reliability justifies the
very large time and resource commitment required to maintain formal
specifications. Since programs tend to behave correctly in the general
case, an alternative to a programmer defining formal specifications is to
automatically infer them from the existing program’s behavior. While
this is necessarily just an approximation to the truly desired behavior
of the program, it allows programmers to check behavior against the
common case, and to check changes in behavior between versions, with
a fraction of the resources required for formal methods.
• Program path information provides an intuitive way to isolate specific
program behavior. Programs taken as a whole are complex entities.
Model checking approaches to software verification run into scalabil-
ity issues for even modestly sized programs, due to the path-explosion
problem. However, isolating the behavior of each single program path
allows an analysis to separate when an action is performed (the condi-
tions under which the path is executed), with what the action is (the
end result of execution of that program path). These analyses can
then be recombined to provide an insight into the full behavior of the
program.
The thesis focuses on three techniques that use this idea in three subfields
of software verification: invariant generation, hardware error detection, and
bug localization. For each of these three techniques, the path information
gathered improved the dynamic analysis beyond past work. The following
subsections introduce the techniques developed in this thesis, and describe
their advantages compared to previous work.
These techniques are not a standalone answer to software verification.
Rather, they should be part of a verification strategy with techniques such as
manual testing and automatic test suite generation. However, when added,
they improve the software development process and program reliability, with
minimal extra human effort.
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1.4.1 Program Path Based Invariant Generation
PRECIS (PREdicate Clustering for Invariant Synthesis) is an invariant gen-
eration technique that uses program path information to guide the statistical
analysis of dynamic data. PRECIS generates invariants on function-level con-
ditional linear input-output relationships. Function-level relationships tend
to be more actionable, since developers generally unit test or document pro-
grams modularly at function boundaries. Further, conditional relationships
allow for the piecemeal analysis of complex functions, since rarely does a sin-
gle relationship hold for all executions of a function. These relationships tie
function inputs to outputs directly, which allows for the capture of an entire
function’s behavior for a given output using a single expression. Figure 1.2
illustrates the use of PRECIS in the software development lifecycle.
Focusing specifically on linear relationships captures interesting function
behaviors. A vast majority of functions return error codes or status values
that are constants or simply a linear combination of the inputs. For example,
errno in Unix is a global variable that is set to fixed constant values when an
error is encountered along a path in the function. Similarly, most functions
in easy or default cases return values or status codes that are linear functions
of the input (often one of the inputs itself) or are constants. Note that while
this PRECIS employs linear regression by default, it can be replaced by an
arbitrary curve fitting strategy, to capture more complex invariants.
PRECIS generates invariants on a per output (or observable) basis. It in-
struments the program to capture inputs, target outputs and path conditions.
For paths with sufficient trace data, it uses a regression strategy to infer an
invariant relating the outputs of a function to the inputs. PRECIS encodes
every path as a path predicate word. Capturing path information through
dynamic analysis ensures that the generated invariants represent true paths
in the program.
One of the primary usage requirements for inferred invariants is succinct-
ness. PRECIS achieves this through a novel clustering of the inferred in-
variants. Paths are examined as candidates for clustering with neighboring
groups. Neighboring groups are identified from the path predicate words
using a notion of distance between words. Among the neighboring groups,
those that can be represented by an inferred invariant that describe the
input-output behavior along all the paths are clustered. By clustering, we
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reduce the number of predicates in the inferred invariants capturing behav-
iors in succinct ways along those paths. The clustering process in PRECIS
enables the topological grouping of a subgraph of paths in a control flow
graph. The invariant inference is repeated for each output value of interest
in the function.
PRECIS uses static, deterministic knowledge to guide dynamic, statistical
methods. This offsets the capacity issues of the static analysis. The domain
awareness and structural knowledge from static analysis provides context and
focus to the statistical technique. The statistical method we use is agglomer-
ative clustering [23] but instead of the standard notion of nearest data points
as neighbors, we define a notion of neighborhood that agrees with actual
structure of the control flow graph. This synergistic interaction between two
solution spaces produces invariants that are simultaneously high-accuracy,
high-coverage, and easy for programmers to understand.
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Figure 1.2: A diagram showing a PRECIS’s use in the SDLC.
1.4.2 Hardware error detection
For high-reliability systems, the presence of hardware faults and their poten-
tial to influence software systems can be an important concern. This thesis
describes a technique that utilizes PRECIS for invariant generation to derive
path-specific invariants at function boundaries. These invariants check the
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Figure 1.3: A diagram showing the generated error detectors’ use in the
SLDC.
output values of a function, and so attempt to detect any corruption in state
that happened during function execution. This corruption can be caused by
a number of reasons: transient errors in memory, defects in functional units,
and interference in communication buses, for example.
PRECIS is well-suited to generate application-level error detectors for
hardware faults. PRECIS invariants tend to be relatively succinct, and they
have a low false positive rate. Further, PRECIS invariants check equality:
this means that a corrupted state is much more likely to be caught than with
an inequality or range-based invariant.
After a program is verified to be functionally correct, invariants are gen-
erated by PRECIS to typify the correct behavior of the program. Each
invariant is then integrated into the program source as an assertion that
checks to see if a variable holds the expected value. Figure 1.3 shows the us-
age of the error detectors in the SDLC. If the observed value does not equal
the expected value, a data corruption is detected. Once the corruption is
identified, corrective steps can be taken by the system administrators, such
as restarting the system or replacing faulty hardware.
The detection overage of hardware errors is evaluated through fault injec-
tion. Experimental results show high error detection coverage (over 60% of
fail-silent violations and 90% of hangs) with a low false positive rate (under
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2.5%) for the applications evaluated.
1.4.3 Bug localization
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Figure 1.4: A diagram showing a PREAMBL’s use in the SDLC.
Invariants are typically removed from shipped production code due to ef-
ficiency concerns, but the need to catch and diagnose bugs remains. This
thesis also presents PREAMBL (PREdicate Analysis for Multi-phase Bug
Location), an integrated approach to invariant generation and statistical de-
bugging. PREAMBL uses PRECIS infrastructure for capturing program
predicate information to guide statistical debugging. It then performs a mul-
tiprocedural analysis and localize bugs to paths of variable lengths. The use
of PREAMBL in the SDLC is shown in Figure 1.4.
The result of PREAMBL is focused, relevant localization. These local-
ized post-deployment bugs on paths can be mapped to pre-release invariants
generated along that path. Together, this information provides for a more
educated and effective bug fixing experience for the developer. Experimental
results demonstrate the efficacy of the use of PRECIS for regression analy-
sis, as well as the ability of PREAMBL to zone in on relevant segments of
program paths more efficiently than the state of the art, as can be seen by
higher scores when judged by the Importance metric introduced in previous
work.
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1.5 Contributions
In summary, this thesis describes the following contributions:
• A novel invariant generation methodology. PRECIS, an invariant
generation methodology based on predicate clustering, is introduced.
The three-step process of data generation, predicate clustering, and in-
variant generation that comprises PRECIS is described. How PRECIS
handles complex program constructs is explained.
• An evaluation of PRECIS’ effectiveness in detecting hardware
errors: The application of invariants generated by PRECIS to hard-
ware error detection is described. Hardware and software implementa-
tions are outlined, and experimental results for detection coverage are
presented.
• Regression detection using PRECIS. We present a method for
integrating automatically generated invariants into program code. We
show a case study illustrating its benefit in identifying regressions, and
evaluate its effectiveness in detecting buggy versions of several bench-
mark applications.
• A bug localization methodology based on PRECIS. PREAMBL,
a bug localization technique based on program path information, is
introduced. Metrics used to score the importance of each path are
listed, and a data structure that optimizes the calculation of these
metrics is presented.
• An evaluation of PREAMBL’s effectiveness. PREAMBL is tested
by introducing bugs into various applications. PREAMBL’s ability to
localize the bugs to a particular code path is compared with other
techniques using metrics introduced in previous literature.
• Automated implementations of PRECIS and PREAMBL. The
implementations of PRECIS and PREAMBL are detailed. Important
optimizations and lessons learned are described.
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1.6 Outline
The rest of this thesis proceeds as follows:
Chapter 2 introduces PRECIS, a program path based invariant genera-
tion tool. A running example of a minimum/maximum function describes
the three-step process of invariant generation: the data generation, predicate
clustering, and invariant generation steps. The chapter describes how PRE-
CIS handles more complicated program constructs, such as loops, functions,
and pointers. In the experimental results section, PRECIS is applied to the
Siemens benchmarks. The comprehensiveness of the generated invariants
is evaluated and the invariants are compared qualitatively with Daikon, a
similar technique.
Chapter 3 describes the application of PRECIS to hardware error detec-
tion. It describes the motivation behind detecting hardware errors, then
describes a software and a hardware approach to using the invariants gener-
ated by PRECIS as part of error detectors. The error detectors are evaluated
through fault injection experiments, and error detection coverage is measured
for various types of manifested errors, such as crashes, fail-silent violations,
and hangs.
Chapter 4 describes a holistic software testing technique, PREAMBL,
based around the path predicate information used by PRECIS. The tech-
nique is twofold; it proposes the use of PRECIS for pre-release software
development such as regression testing, while performing a lighter instru-
mentation processes post-release to localize bugs to specific interprocedural
path segments and map them to relevant generated invariants. Two case
studies show examples of PREAMBL used to detect bugs. PREAMBL is
applied to several benchmark applications to evaluate its effectiveness.
Chapter 5 covers previous work related to the techniques discussed in the
thesis. The chapter is divided into three sections, each of which describes the
related work of one chapter. Section 5.1 describes prior automatic invariant
generation work and compares it with PRECIS. Section 5.2 describes previ-
ous work involving automated error detection. Finally, Section 5.3 describes
previous bug localization work and compares/contrasts it with PREAMBL.
Chapter 6 describes the implementation work of PRECIS tool. It exam-
ines the important design decisions that were made in developing the tool,
and implementation details of the various stages of the tool. Standard file
12
formats used for storing trace data and generated invariants are shown. The
fault injection and predicate capture frameworks used in Chapters 3 and 4,
respectively, are described.
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CHAPTER 2
PROGRAM PATH GUIDED INVARIANT
GENERATION
The integration of assertions into programs is a time-tested software veri-
fication practice [24]. Assertions are statements that describe an invariant
property of program execution: one that is always true at a given point in
program execution. These statements are evaluated at runtime to ensure they
always hold. The use of assertions has several advantages as a means of guar-
anteeing certain behavior during the execution of the program. Other than
their obvious benefits of testing variables to make sure they are acceptable,
assertions establish a design-by-contract system that formalizes the inputs,
intermediaries, and outputs of a system. This helps catch undesirable be-
havior caused by security exploits and serves to document code, leading to
greater programmer understanding.
However, most software written today makes very limited use of assertions;
they are typically used to check relatively trivial edge-cases such as null-
pointers or out-of-bounds array references, if they are used at all. Although
this is unfortunate, it is somewhat understandable; writing good assertions
takes developer time away from implementing new features, and is generally
given a lower priority.
Automatically inferring invariants from program behavior addresses this
issue of program verification being given a lower priority in industry, while
providing documentation, correctness, and security benefits. An argument
Figure 2.1: PRECIS flow for generating invariants through predicate
clustering.
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can be made that assertions generated from a program are only as good as
the program itself. However, most program behavior is correct by the time
extended testing begins, and a significant proportion of bugs are regressions:
broken functionality that was working in an earlier version of the code. In
addition, assertions can be inspected by an engineer to both verify correctness
and ensure intent.
This chapter introduces PRECIS, an invariant generation technique based
on program path information. A hallmark of a useful invariant generation
tool is that it generates succinct invariants and also generates as few spurious
assertions as possible. The distinctive strength of PRECIS can be attributed
to the following principles:
• First, PRECIS focuses on invariants that describe the return values of
a function as well as side effects to global variables or heap values upon
completion of a function execution. These values are referred to as
the outputs of a function. Writing invariants exclusively on outputs al-
lows for the description of an entire function’s behavior while requiring
invariants on a relatively small set of variables.
• Second, input-output relationships in a function tend to often be simple
(and often linear). Further, confidence in such inferred relationships
can be reinforced through these observed input-output relationships
recurring over the same path in the function in multiple tests in a test
suite.
• Third, PRECIS takes advantage of the path information from the con-
trol flow graph of a function to intelligently cluster invariants together.
The goal of this chapter is to show that applying the aforementioned prin-
ciples generates invariants that are valuable to the developer and succinct in
their description. Specifically, Sections 2.1-2.3 describe the steps that com-
prise PRECIS through a running example of a simple minimum/maximum
function. Section 2.4 describes how PRECIS handles more general program
constructs, such as loops, internal function calls, arrays, and pointers. Sec-
tion 2.5 evaluates the technique on the Siemens benchmarks, and compares
the generated invariants to Daikon, a similar technique.
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int min, max; //outputs
void minmax(int a, int b, int c) { //Inputs
min = a, max = a;
if (min > b) //p0
min = b;
else if (max < b ) //p1
max = b;
if (min > c) //p2
min = c;
else if (max < c) //p3
max = c;
}
Figure 2.2: An example program to find the minimum and maximum of
three integers. a, b, c are the inputs and min, max are the outputs.
Predicates p0,p1,p2, and p3 are defined for each of the branch conditions.
PRECIS Methodology Overview
Figure 2.1 illustrates the flow of PRECIS to generate invariants. It consists of
three main steps: instrumenting the target function to generate the required
dynamic trace data for the function, applying our method of path condition
(predicate) clustering on this data, and, finally, generating invariants based
on the identified clusters.
We discuss each of these steps in detail with the help of the running ex-
ample shown in Figure 2.2, which consists of a function to find the minimum
and maximum of three integers, a, b, and c. We then discuss how we han-
dle more complex program constructs such as loops, pointers, arrays, and
function calls.
2.1 Data Generation
The first step in PRECIS flow is to instrument each target function in the
program with its inputs, path conditions, and outputs that are relevant to
record as part of the function’s trace data. This instrumentation is easily
automated for any function whose source code is available, since we cur-
rently track all possible inputs, predicates (path conditions), and outputs of
a function.
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We define inputs to be the data on which the outputs of a function directly
depend. We consider the function arguments, the results of internal function
calls, global variables, and arbitrary heap accesses. In Figure 2.2, the inputs
are simply variables a, b, and c. We define outputs to refer to the after-
effects of a function. Function return values are the most obvious, but we
also consider changes to global variables and persistent heap modifications,
since these are often considered the true effects of a particular function. In
the example, the outputs are min and max, both global variables. Finally,
predicates are the conditional statements which control the path through the
program, also referred to in literature as path conditions. In other words,
knowing the values of all predicates is equivalent to knowing the path taken
in the function. Loops are handled in a different manner as described later
in Section 2.4. For the example program, we consider: (min > b), (max
< b), (min > c), and (max < c) as predicates, which we will refer to as
p0, p1, p2, and p3, respectively. Since we want to capture the behavior
of the target function, we record the specific value each input, output, and
predicate takes for each run through the function. Inputs and outputs of
basic atomic types are converted to a numerical floating point representation
before recording their values so that they can be used for linear regression,
as described in Section 2.2. Pointers, arrays, and composite data types are
handled differently, as shown later in Section 2.4.
When the program is exercised using a test case, the instrumented code
captures the input, output, and predicate values along a particular program
path. This path captures a behavior of a single path in each of the functions
in the program. Using a battery of tests, we get more data points for inputs,
outputs, and predicates. Further, a good test suite can achieve a greater
coverage of paths in the program that are exercised by these tests. Ideally,
a good test suite exercises all interesting function behaviors, exhibiting high
code coverage. In our example, the test suite may simply be 100 sets of
random values for variables a, b, and c. The end result will be a set of
behavior tuples of the form <input values,predicate values,output values>
which describes the behavior of the function over the test suite. Table 2.1
shows a sample trace data for the example program.
17
Table 2.1: Sample trace data for the example program from Figure 2.2.
2.2 Predicate Clustering
The second step, predicate clustering lies at the crux of PRECIS invariant
generation. We first define some terms that describe the predicates that are
key to our inferred invariants. We then describe an algorithm to infer reliable
path-based invariants. We then demonstrate how we can use clustering to
generate succinct invariants, avoiding unnecessary predicates.
Before we describe the process of predicate clustering we must first define
some key entities:
• A predicate word is a string containing the values taken for all function
predicates during the execution of the function.
• A predicate group is the set of <input values, predicate values, out-
put values> behavior tuples in trace data that share the same predicate
word.
• An output function is a linear expression for a target function output
in terms of the inputs.
• A seed cluster is the set of behavior tuples in a predicate group that
has an associated output function that can be obtained by a successful
regression.
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2.2.1 Basic invariant generation
We first discuss our approach to inferring invariants simply from the observed
input and output values along a single path in a function. Here we apply our
intuition that program traces with the same program path through a function
have the same, often linear, expression for function outputs in terms of the
inputs.
Since we evaluate and record the value each predicate takes during run-
time, we can encode a specific program path into a predicate word. Thus,
we consider all behavior tuples in our trace data with the same predicate
word taken together as a predicate group. We then run a linear least-squares
regression on each predicate group, attempting to write each output as a
linear combination of the inputs. A regression is said to succeed (making it
a successful regression) if there is a linear function that represents an output
in terms of the inputs to the function that satisfies all the behavior tuples in
a predicate group.
For example, consider the program path in which the first if statement is
taken, thus the second is not evaluated, the third is not taken, and neither
is the fourth. This path corresponds to the predicate word p = 1X00 (since
the predicate p1 was not evaluated, we represent its value with an X). In our
sample trace data, we have four behavior tuples in this predicate group, as
shown in Table 2.1. Since we have (at least) one more tuple than we have
input variables, we can perform a linear regression to attempt to derive a
linear combination of the inputs that describes each output. For min, we
find that the coefficients to the linear combination are [0,1,0,0]; in other
words, min = b.
The seed cluster is computed for each predicate group with enough behav-
ior tuples to perform a regression. The result is a set of seed clusters, each
representing a single predicate group with some function for the output as a
linear combination of the inputs. We will refer to this function as the output
function of that cluster. At this stage, if there are multiple seed clusters
with the same output function, they are merged into a single seed cluster
containing all relevant behavior tuples.
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Algorithm 1 Generate Seed Clusters
Require: A set predicate groups, containing all predicate groups in trace data
Ensure: A set seed clusters, containing all seed clusters
{Generate seed clusters}
seed clusters := {}
for all predicate group in predicate groups do
(coeff, error) := LinReg(predicate group)
if error = 0 then
{Add new seed cluster}
new cluster := (coeff, predicate group)
seed clusters := seed clusters ∪ new cluster
end if
end for
2.2.2 Predicate clustering
After the generation of seed clusters, there can still be cases where there are
insufficient behavior tuples in our predicate group to generalize its behavior.
To help address this case, we introduce the concept of distance between pred-
icate words. We define the distance as an analogue of the Hamming distance
[23]. The distance between two predicate words is equal to the number of
predicate values by which they differ. Distance is a useful concept in re-
lation to predicates because it helps to quantify the similarity/dissimilarity
between two paths. It is our experience that program paths that are almost
the same, but only differ in a few branches, often share the same behavior
for a particular output variable. Thus a pair of predicate groups with a low
distance is much more likely to have the same output function.
We use this heuristic to identify the clusters which most likely share the
same behavior as predicate groups without enough tuples to independently
derive an output function. We attempt to merge such groups with the
seed clusters in single-link agglomerative fashion [23] starting from the least-
distance clusters. We call this process predicate clustering. In Table 2.1,
note that the predicate group 1X01 only has one tuple, which is clearly not
enough to perform a linear regression. However, since it is only 1 distance
away from 1X00, which already has a derived output function for min, we
attempt to merge the tuples.
A merge is said to be successful if a linear regression on the combination
of the existing cluster and the new predicate group is successful. In other
words, a merge is successful if the output function derived for the existing
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Algorithm 2 Predicate Clustering
Require: A set pred groups, containing all predicate groups in trace data besides
those that have been converted into seed clusters, and a set of seed clusters as
generated by Algorithm 1.
Ensure: A set pred clusters, containing all predicate clusters merged according
to behavior, a set pred groups containing all predicate groups that could not be
merged
for all pgroup in pred groups do
failed merges := {}
repeat
{Find min dist. cluster whose merge has not failed}
min dist := MinDist(pred clusters,failed merges)
{Attempt to merge cluster with predicate group}
success := attemptMerge(cluster, pgroup)
if success then
cluster := Merge(cluster, pgroup)
pred groups := pred groups− pgroup
else
failed merges := failed merges ∪ (cluster, pgroup)
end if
until pred clusters− failed merges is empty
or success
end for
cluster matches all tuples for the predicate group. A successful merge creates
a cluster that contains both the behavior tuples in the existing cluster as well
as those in the predicate group being merged.
Predicate clustering algorithm
Compute the distance between each unclustered predicate group and all the
predicate clusters. For a particular predicate group, rank the clusters by
distance and test the predicate group with the first cluster for a successful
merge. If it succeeds, then merge the clusters. If unsuccessful, the predicate
group will be tested against the next-closest cluster. In the example above,
predicate groups 1X01 and 1X00 are successfully merged and the resulting
output function for the cluster is min = b. This iterative process continues
until all predicate groups that follow the same output function as any cluster
are successfully merged.
The end result after predicate clustering is a set of clusters, each likely
containing multiple predicate groups, each of which expresses a different out-
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put function of the program. Certain predicate groups may fail regression,
either because the output is a nonlinear function of the inputs, or because
it could not be merged with a seed cluster and the cluster does not have
enough tuples for an independent regression. These predicate groups do not
belong to any cluster, and thus no invariants will be generated to describe
their behavior.
2.3 Invariant Generation
In the final step of PRECIS flow, we generate invariants for clusters which
have output functions. Since by the end of clustering all predicate groups
present in the trace data that share the same output function are merged,
this gives us a complete summary of the conditions under which a particular
output behavior of the function occurs.
For example, the following invariant is generated for the sample trace data
from Table 2.1:
(p ∈ {1X01, 1X00})⇒ (min = b).
The antecedent of the invariant, p ∈ {1X01, 1X00}, describes the set of
predicate words that the invariant covers. If the program path taken during a
particular function execution corresponds the predicate word 1X01 or 1X00,
then the consequent of the invariant specifies that the output min must take
on the value of the input b. If the predicate word is neither of the two, the
invariant does not put any constraint on the output value.
If we convert these invariants back into a symbolic form corresponding
to function variables, we often see that our method eliminates irrelevant
predicates to capture a function’s deeper meaning. Consider the predicate
word in our example 1X01. Symbolically, it refers to program runs where:
#4(min > b) ∧ ¬#8(min > c) ∧#10(max < c)
The number in front of a statement indicates the line in program code at
which it should be evaluated. Likewise, the predicate word 1X00 corresponds
to program runs where:
#4(min > b) ∧ ¬#8(min > c) ∧ ¬#10(max < c)
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Since both predicates are in the same cluster, we can conclude that the
last predicate, corresponding to ¬#10(max < c) is irrelevant, since its value
does not affect the output function. Thus, from the predicate words we can
conclude that #4(min > b) ∧ ¬#8(min > c) alone is the necessary and
sufficient condition for the output min to be assigned to b at the end of
the function. This matches our intuition that if min (which is initially a) is
greater than b at line 3, and min (which is now the value of b) is less than
c at line 9, then b must be the overall minimum of a, b, and c. The same
process allows us to make similar conclusions about the cases where a and c
are the minimum and maximum of the three input variables.
2.3.1 Extending the method to multiple output variables
Until now, we have described the predicate clustering process for a single
output. In reality, most functions have multiple outputs, each with different
behavior that depends on different predicates. Thus, to generate assertions
for the complete program, we repeat the previously described process for
all outputs. We then apply the invariant generation technique described in
step 3 to each set of generated clusters, and combine the resulting assertions
generated to express the behavior of the program for all outputs.
2.4 Handling Complex Program Constructs and Types
The example in Figure 2.2 is a simple program only containing if/else
conditions and assignments to local or global variables of basic types. How-
ever, programs usually contain more complex control flow constructs such as
while/for loops, internal function calls as well as pointer, array and user-
defined data types. We briefly describe how we handle each of these in the
PRECIS flow.
2.4.1 Function calls
Since an internal function call, such as rand() in Figure 2.3, represents
behavior that we consider outside the scope of invariants covering a target
function, we use outputs from the function call as inputs for the purpose of
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int min, max; //outputs
void max_rand(){
//function inputs: N/A
int i = 0;
while (i < 100) {
//inputs: i, orig(L1.i), L1.rand().ret
int rand_num = rand() % 1000;
if ( rand > max ) //p0
max = rand_num;
i++;
//outputs: L1.i, L1.max
}
//loop outputs = inputs: L1.i, L1.max
max = max + 1;
//function output: max
}
Figure 2.3: A function that uses a loop to generate 100 random numbers
between 1 and 1000, selects the largest among them, and returns that
number plus one.
invariant generation. The most straightforward output is the return value,
which we represent in Figure 2.3 X as L1.rand().ret. We also consider
pointer values passed as arguments to the called function, since modifications
to those can also influence the output of the target function. These outputs
are recorded as new target function inputs at the call site.
2.4.2 Loops and functions
Consider Figure 2.3. Our high-level approach to handling such functions is
to write an invariant for the desired output variable directly before the loop
starts, write another invariant within the scope of the loop that captures the
changes in state that can happen during a single iteration, and finally define
the value of the variables at the termination of a loop as new inputs to the
enclosing block (which can be a function or enclosing loop).
In our example, this first means processing the contents of the loop. We
refer to the instrumented inputs in this case as: L1 pre.i, L1.i, L1.max, and
L1.rand().ret. These variables refer to the value of i before the loop starts,
the value of i at the start of the current iteration, the current maximum
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random value seen, and the random number generated by the iteration’s call
to rand(), respectively. Our two outputs in this case are L1.max and L1.i,
because they are the variables that persist across iterations. We have a single
predicate p0, which is the conditional that checks if the generated random
number is bigger than the current max.
When we run this block through the PRECIS flow, the result will be
invariants that express the relationship between loop iterations. For example,
one invariant will indicate that if L1.rand().ret is greater than max, then
max is assigned to that value. Another will express the increment-by-one
behavior of i on each iteration. Together these invariants will attempt to
capture the properties that hold across loop iterations.
To generate meaningful invariants for function outputs that depend on
operations in the loop, we define new inputs corresponding to each of the
outputs of the loop; in this case L1.post.i and L1 post.max. These new
inputs are recorded as part of the larger function instrumentation process
immediately after exiting from the loop. We use these as a basis to write
invariants for our function outputs. For example, at the end of max rand,
max is assigned to the largest random number generated in the loop plus one.
PRECIS represents that by generating the assertion max == L1 post.max +
1.
Our method for handling loops takes inspiration from the formal process
of writing loop invariants. While we do not rigorously prove our generated
invariants correct and complete, we rely on the same basic premise that if
an output is computed correctly until the start of the loop, likewise across
iterations, and is handled correctly from the exit of the loop to the end of
the program, then the variable is correct overall.
2.4.3 Arrays and pointers
Reading an element of an array is considered similar to a function call in
that we define a new input to hold the value read. Reads from a memory
location referenced by a pointer are handled similarly.
A write to an array element or to a memory location referenced by a pointer
is a persistent memory modification and hence is considered a function out-
put (Section 2.1). However, the value at such a memory location might be
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Table 2.2: Summary of benchmark programs and PRECIS invariant
coverage.
Program Lines of Code Functions Invariants
Average
Invariant
Coverage
gzip 7477 141 1281 49.9%
replace 413 33 48 77.15%
schedule 564 24 104 67.25%
schedule2 323 22 97 78.0%
space 6199 165 1583 91.4%
totinfo 565 21 161 84.3%
BST.java 168 1 12 73%
changed by another pointer later in the function, which would lead to an
incorrect value being recorded as being output. This problem is known as
the aliasing problem. In order to avoid this, we only store the location in
memory of the address that was modified at the point in the program where
the write is performed. We read the value at the that address only at the
end of the target function to ensure we record the true output value.
2.4.4 User-defined types
For structs in C programs as well as classes in object-oriented languages,
each field or member variable of basic types is used to define an input or
output appropriately.
2.5 Experimental Results
We evaluate the PRECIS methodology through experiments on the Siemens
benchmarks [25]. All experiments were carried out on a machine with Intel
Core i5 750 with 16 GB RAM. Time taken for data generation and clustering
was under 10 seconds for each experiment.
We use invariant coverage to denote the number of program paths covered
by an invariant. We evaluate the generated invariants w.r.t. this metric.
Table 2.2 summarizes the programs used for experiments along with the
average invariant coverage of PRECIS invariants for these programs.
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Table 2.3: Summary of results after running PRECIS on functions from
replace and schedule. Columns 3 shows the percentage of covered paths
(P) while column 4 shows the number of invariants generated (N). †For
loops, the number of paths inside the body of the loop are considered.
Total number of paths would be higher than that shown in Column 3.
Function/Loop Output P(%) N Comments
variable
esc result 100 5 Complete cov-
erage for both
outputs, no
clustering for
result
(’replace.c’) *i 100 2
while loop† lj 100† 2
Complete
coverage and
clustering for
4/7 outputs
in makepat j 100 2
(’replace.c’) junk 100 3
getres 100 3
done 100 2
escjunk 100 2
lastj 100 2
while loop† escjunk 100† 2 Complete
coverage and
clustering for
3/5 outputs, no
clustering for *j
in dodash junk 100 5
(’replace.c’) k 100 2
*i 0 0
*j 100 5
del ele d list 100 1
Complete
coverage for 4/6
outputs,
clustering for all
outputs
(’schedule.c’) d list->first 100 2
d list->last 100 2
d list->mem count 100 1
d ele->next->prev 50 1
a ele->prev->next 50 1
2.5.1 Siemens benchmarks
Table 2.3 summarizes the results obtained by running PRECIS on some func-
tions from Siemens benchmarks ‘replace.c’ and ‘schedule.c’. Results for
remaining functions are not shown here due to space constraints.
In the majority of cases, the invariants are found to cover all paths, i.e.,
completely describe the output behavior in terms of inputs. For some outputs
such as d ele->next->prev, the output is only defined in some of the paths.
Therefore the generated invariants do not have complete invariant coverage.
Table 2.4 shows the invariants generated for output *i in the esc function
from replace.c. At a high level, esc processes escape sequences. It takes
two arguments: a string, char* s, and an index passed by reference, int*
i. If the character at the index *i reflects the start of an escape sequence
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Table 2.4: Example invariants that PRECIS generates for output *i of the
function esc from ‘replace.c’.
Output Variable Invariant
(s[orig(*i)] != ESCAPE) || (s[orig(*i)] == ESCAPE &&
s[orig(*i) + 1] == ENDSTR) ⇒ (*i == orig(*i))
*i s[orig(*i)] == ESCAPE && s[orig(*i) + 1] != ENDSTR
&& s[orig(*i) + 1] != ’n’ && s[orig(*i) + 1] ==
’t’) || (s[orig(*i)] == ESCAPE && s[orig(*i) + 1]
!= ENDSTR && s[orig(*i) + 1] != ’n’ && s[orig(*i)
+ 1] != ’t’) || s[orig(*i)] == ESCAPE && s[orig(*i)
+ 1] != ENDSTR && s[orig(*i) + 1] == ’n’) ⇒ (*i ==
orig(*i) + 1)
s[orig(*i)] == ESCAPE && s[orig(*i) + 1] != ENDSTR &&
s[orig(*i) + 1] != ’n’ && s[orig(*i) + 1] == ’t’) ⇒
(result == TAB)
(s[orig(*i)] != ESCAPE) ⇒ (result == s[orig(*i)])
result (s[orig(*i)] == ESCAPE && s[orig(*i) + 1] != ENDSTR
&& s[orig(*i) + 1] != ’n’ && s[orig(*i) + 1] != ’t’)
⇒ (result == s[orig(*i)+1])
(s[orig(*i)] == ESCAPE && s[orig(*i) + 1] != ENDSTR
&& s[orig(*i) + 1] == ’n’ ) ⇒ (result == NEWLINE)
(s[orig(*i)] == ESCAPE && s[orig(*i) + 1] == ENDSTR)
⇒ (result == ESCAPE)
d ele->next->prev (!(!d list || !d ele) && (d ele->next)) ⇒
(d ele->next->prev == d ele->prev)
(either \n, \t, or \0), then the function parses the sequence. At the end of
the function, *i+1 refers to the character after the just processed character
or sequence.
Two invariants are generated for *i: one that describes executions in which
*i does not change, and the other covering executions where *i is incre-
mented by one. An example of clustering is the disjunction of the two cases
in which *i does not change: either the character indexed by *i is not an
escape character or it is, but the subsequent character is invalid. The same
process also allows PRECIS to identify and combine all paths that cause *i
to increment.
2.5.2 Comparison with Daikon
We now compare the invariants generated by PRECIS and Daikon [14] for
Siemens benchmarks ‘replace.c’ and ‘schedule.c’.
Since PRECIS invariants express outputs as a function of inputs, we com-
pare them to the function postconditions inferred by Daikon for the same
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outputs. It is possible that one PRECIS invariant represents multiple Daikon
invariants and vice versa. Therefore we ranked the collection of invariants
for each output as a whole. For objective comparison, we define four ranks
to evaluate the quality of the invariants:
• Rank 0: Spurious invariants that are true in the given trace data but
do not hold in the program in general are assigned Rank 0.
• Rank 1: These invariants provide useful information about outputs,
but do not express the outputs as exact functions of other variables.
• Rank 2: Rank 2 invariants express output as an exact function of
inputs. However, the functions hold only on a subset of program paths.
• Rank 3: These invariants express the output function completely i.e.
along all possible paths.
Figure 2.4 shows the percentage of total invariants belonging to each of
the described ranks for PRECIS and Daikon. Daikon generates some (13%)
spurious invariants, while PRECIS generates none. All the invariants gener-
ated by PRECIS belong to Ranks 2 and 3. In some cases, Daikon is found
to generalize a PRECIS invariant of Rank 2 or 3 into a Rank 1 invariant.
Figure 2.4: Percentage of total invariants belonging to each rank inferred
by PRECIS (left) and Daikon (right).
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CHAPTER 3
APPLICATION OF INVARIANTS TO
HARDWARE ERROR DETECTION
This chapter presents a technique for generating hardware error detectors
for C and C++ programs based the invariants generated by PRECIS. The
detectors identify data and control errors in an application. There are sev-
eral possible faults that could cause these errors: cosmic ray strikes, pro-
cess defects, and mechanical device malfunction are examples. In each case,
program state is corrupted from the correct value due to a hardware mal-
function. In particular, these detectors identify two manifestations of these
faults: data errors and control errors [26]. Data errors cause a divergence
in data values from the error-free program. Control errors represent an in-
correct path through the control flow graph (CFG) of a program. Detecting
these errors allows corrective measures to be taken and reduces the chance
of irrecoverable errors in application state.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.1 discusses the
motivation behind detecting hardware errors using invariants. Section 3.2
provides a high-level overview of the way PRECIS invariants are used to con-
struct error detectors. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 provide details on a software and
a hardware implementation of the error detectors, respectively. Section 3.5
provides experimental results describing the fault injection methodology and
provides data on error coverage, the rate of false positives, overhead, and the
relationship between CFG coverage and error detection coverage.
3.1 Motivation
Traditional hardware-based techniques like ECC in memory have limited use
in detecting errors that manifest at the software level for several reasons.
First, an error that manifests in software can be caused by a malfunction
in any of several hardware components, for example: functional units in the
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CPU, cache memory, main memory, hard disks, and the buses and links that
interconnect them. A single, software-level approach is considerably less com-
plex than integrating error correction schemes for each of these components.
Further, a software-based approach allows the selective use of error detectors
on only those applications and application subcomponents where reliability
is a concern; those for which reliability is not of high importance can run on
the same hardware without the overhead of error detectors.
In addition, a software-level approach has the potential to provide much
higher error coverage. ECC and other parity-check codes are designed to
only detect a certain number of bit-flips from the correct value. In contrast,
the error detectors proposed in this thesis check for exact values, and thus
have a much higher likelihood of detecting an error.
Replication techniques [27] have also been used for software-level checking
of hardware errors. The replication causes an unreasonably high overhead
if faithfully implemented for every line of code. In cases where the replica-
tion is limited to certain program points, the coverage is consequently low.
These replication techniques are also not selective with their detection; they
frequently detect errors that are not catastrophic in nature [28]. Static pro-
gram or model analysis techniques suffer from computational capacity issues
due to their attempt to enumerate all possible executions. Dynamic statis-
tical techniques are computationally efficient, and have the benefit of being
able to reason statistically about variables whose inherent static relationship
is very complex. However, they frequently lack context and produce large
volumes of information, including irrelevant or unimportant inferences.
Prior invariant generation based on dynamic techniques such as [29, 14, 15]
generate invariants between variables based on certain templates by observ-
ing program traces. Invariants generated in this manner often include spuri-
ous behavior; the derived relationships may hold for the observed data but
not the program in general. This is because many statistically correlated,
but actually noncausal behaviors are captured. This lack of focus results in
incorrect data values as well as incidentally inferred control information.
Static techniques for error detection [1, 3] attempt to infer invariants by
analyzing the source code. These techniques generate formally correct invari-
ants. However, due to the path explosion issues in software, such techniques
are likely to suffer from computational capacity problems.
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3.2 Approach
In this thesis, we use PRECIS (PREdicate Clustering for Invariant Synthesis)
[30] to derive the core relationships checked by our detectors. PRECIS is an
invariant generation technique that uses program path information to guide
the statistical analysis of dynamic data. The generated invariants are on a
per output, per path basis. These invariants are then used as error detectors
to ensure program state remains correct throughout execution.
To generate invariants with PRECIS, we instrument the program to cap-
ture inputs, target outputs and path conditions (which are captured as pred-
icates). The program is then run through a training phase, generating trace
data representing normal behavior of the program. For paths with suffi-
cient trace data, we use a regression strategy to infer an invariant relating
the outputs of a function to the inputs. Similar paths are then clustered
together, leading to general, high-coverage invariants. Capturing path in-
formation through dynamic analysis ensures that the generated invariants
represent true, feasible paths in the program.
We evaluate the generated detectors through fault injection experiments
that simulate the effects of transient errors, e.g. flipping the bits, on the
data states of applications. The data states, which are the injection targets
of fault injection, are all local and global variables used during the execution
of the target applications. After each fault is injected to the target variable,
the behavior of the target applications will be observed and classified into
one of four categories of errors: crashes, hangs, a fail-silent violation (FSV),
or not manifested. Crashes include all abnormal program terminations, such
as segmentation faults. Hangs are errors which cause a program to never
terminate. FSVs represent an incorrect output of the program. An error is
not manifested if it does not cause an abnormal termination or an incorrect
output, and is not detected.
In the tested applications, our detectors cover an average of 23% of injected
crashes. They cover 61% of fail-silent violations and silent data corruptions.
For those applications with significant number of hangs, our detectors cover
95%. The performance overhead generated by our technique depends on
the extent of checking, and whether the implementation is in software or
hardware. On average for software, it is about 100%. We provide a possi-
ble hardware implementation to decrease overhead, but do not evaluate its
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performance characteristics.
Another important advantage of using PRECIS is the extremely low rate
of false positives in the detection (less than 2.5% in the tested applications).
Detectors that are very broad in scope, like variable value based, or interval
based detectors, suffer from a high false positive rate [29, 14, 15]. In our
case, we are able to generate more focused detectors, since we generate in-
variants for a single program path. This would normally present the problem
of “too much focus,” causing lower error coverage per detector. However, we
circumvent this problem by using clustering, which increases the scope of the
invariant from a single concrete path to a cluster of similar paths. Our invari-
ants are able to have a negligible false positive rate without compromising
much on scope.
Using our methodology we also study the relationship between the control
flow graph coverage of an invariant and corresponding error coverage. The
CFG coverage of an invariant corresponds to the percentage of CFG paths
that when executed, trigger the invariant. An invariant is triggered when the
antecedent condition evaluates to true. We show that invariants with high
CFG coverage tend to also have high error coverage. This can be used as a
heuristic for the selective inclusion of invariants in the deployed set.
3.3 Software Implementation
This subsection describes the process through which the invariants generated
are integrated into the target application code to support runtime error de-
tection. It first describes the process at a high level then illustrates it with
an example.
Recall that PRECIS generates invariants on input-output relationships.
This means that the function exit points are a natural place to put our checks.
Since our checks are of the form “antecedent” implies “consequent,” we can
represent the checks in two steps. Since the expression in the consequent is
only binding if the antecedent is true, then we can put the condition in the
antecedent in an if statement. In this case, the consequent can be checked
through an assert statement in the body of the if. For readability, we
generate a new checking function for each original function in the program,
and call it <F> check, where <F> is the original function’s name. The
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checking function is called at all exit points in the original function.
int min, max; //outputs
void minmax (int a, int b, int c) { //inputs
min = a, max = a;
int in0=a, in1=b, in2=c;
int p0,p1,p2,p3;
int out0,out1;
if (p0 = (min > b))
min = b;
else if (p1 = (max < b))
max = b;
if (p2 = (min > c))
min = c;
else if (p3 = (max > c))
max = c;
out0 = min, out1 = max;
minmax_check(in0, in1, in2, p0, p1, p2, p3, out0, out1);
}
void minmax_check(int in0, int in1, int p0, int p1, int p2,
int p3, int out0, int out1){
if (p0 == 0 && p2 == 0) {
assert(out0 == in0);
} else if (p0 == 1 && p2 == 0) {
assert(out0 == in1);
} else if (p2 == 1) {
assert(out0 == in2);
}
//Similar structure for out1
}
Figure 3.1: An instrumented and self-checking version of minmax. The
minmax check function serves as the function’s error detector. The
assertion structure for out1 is not shown for brevity but is of the same
format as out0.
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To further illustrate this procedure, we continue the minmax example in-
troduced in [30]. A self-checking version of minmax is shown in Figure 3.1.
During the instrumentation phase, the values of the in (PRECIS inputs), p
(predicates), and out (output) variables during each execution are appended
to a text file in comma-separated format. The “in” variables will be eval-
uated when they are introduced to the function, the “p” variables will be
evaluated with their corresponding predicate, and the “out” variables will
be evaluated at the function exit(s). As the program is run through a test
suite or regular execution, this will build training data which can later be
used for the predicate clustering process.
Once the trace data is fed into the predicate clustering tool, we can derive
three invariants to describe the output min:
• (p0 = 0 ∧ p2 = 0)⇒ (out0 = in0)
• (p0 = 1 ∧ p2 = 0)⇒ (out0 = in1)
• (p2 = 1)⇒ (out0 = in2)
To integrate these invariants into the code as assertions, we perform a two-
step process. First, we define a function minmax check, which is responsible
for verifying that these invariants hold at runtime. One way of representing
these checks is an assert statement inside an if statement. This corre-
sponds intuitively to the format of the invariants generated: the antecedent
represents the “if” path condition under which the invariant holds, and the
consequent is the output value that is being “asserted” to be true. Figure
3.1 shows this integration into a C program for output out0, which corre-
sponds logically to the function output min.
Second, we insert function calls to the checking function at all function
exits. In Figure 2.2, the check call is inserted at the only exit point (at the
end of the function).
3.4 Hardware Implementation
The following section provides an alternate implementation of the derived
error detectors: one which introduces additional hardware in the form of
a coprocessor to provide checking functionality. While we use the software
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Table 3.1: An example Instrumentation ROM.
Program Counter [32b] Predicate [1b] Predicate Number [4b]
0x6a45b320 1 9
0x3485ba53 0 12
implementation described in Subsection 3.3 for the rest of the thesis, we also
propose the hardware implementation as a means of reducing time and space
overheads for performance-critical applications.
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Figure 3.2: A high-level architecture showing the proposed hardware
implementation of the error detectors.
In this section we propose a hardware-based architecture of the error de-
tectors in order to reduce overhead in performance-critical systems focused
on high reliability. The design is based on the Reliability and Security Engine
(RSE) framework described in [31]. This design has not been implemented,
but serves as a proof-of-concept for applications where performance is of the
highest importance.
Specifically, we propose a invariant checking coprocessor that takes signals
from the main processor and uses them to check the invariants in parallel
with regular execution. A high-level diagram of the architecture is shown in
Figure 3.2.
The proposed architecture is general, but with the shown ROMs loaded
with application-specific values. During compilation, the PRECIS inputs and
predicates are identified. The Program Counter (PC) values representing the
location in machine code that a given input or predicate is computed is saved.
Each mapping from a PC to the corresponding input or predicate number is
stored in the Instrumentation ROM, as shown in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.2: An example Invariant ROM.
PC [32b]
Predicate
Word [16b]
Input0
Coeff [32b]
...
Input15
Coeff [32b]
0x00126a7bc 0x0000 0 ... 1
0x00126a7bc 0x0001 1 ... 0
0xff162ab4 0x3F26 1 ... 5
During program execution, the instrumentation ROM will allow the in-
variant checking processor to identify when an input or predicate is being
computed. If there is an entry corresponding to the current PC, the write
enable (WE) flag will be set for the register file corresponding to that entry
(either the Input Reg or Predicate Reg). This will cause the relevant value
(Commit Out for inputs and brValue for predicates) to be saved to the regis-
ter file. In the example shown in Table 3.1, when the PC is 0x6145b320, the
Commit Out value would be saved to Input Register 9. When the current
PC cannot be found in the table, no value is saved to either register file.
While the Instrumentation ROM stores the location of inputs and predi-
cates, the Invariant ROM stores the location of outputs and the generated
invariants that describe them. Similarly to inputs and predicates, during
program compilation the compiler will save the PC at which each output
is computed. Invariants are then generated using the standard PRECIS
software-level flow. These invariants are then integrated into the Invariant
ROM.
An example invariant ROM is shown in Table 3.2. An invariant is evaluated
when the current PC corresponds to an output invariant stored in the table,
and the predicate word (the contents of the Predicate Register) corresponds
to a predicate word entry stored for that output. For example, for the output
PC 0x00126a7bc and the predicate word 0x0000, the invariant (out = in15)
will be evaluated. This is done by multiplying each stored input with the
corresponding Input Coefficient. The resulting products are then summed
and compared with the observed output value, which is the current value at
the Commit Out wire. If they are not the same, an invariant violation is
detected.
The proposed architecture is for the invariant checking phase, and does
not support generation. This is because we envision the invariant genera-
tion process to be done once per application, before widespread deployment.
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Thus, performance is not as critical during that phase. The Instrumentation
ROM and Invariant ROM tables can be generated once and loaded onto sev-
eral systems. Once loaded, the Invariant Checking Processor can be used to
provide error detection in real time.
3.4.1 Language support
The instrumentation process described was designed for C and C++, but it
can be easily extended to Object-Oriented Languages such as Java and C#.
In both cases, the instrumentation process is considerably simpler because it
does not need to handle pointer-based memory modification; rather, objects
are treated the same way as structs are treated, and print all of their sub-
attributes as additional outputs.
Data Generation in the PRECIS flow simply involves compiling the instru-
mented source file and running the established test suite on it. The result
will be a file in CSV (Comma Separated Value) format which contains the
input, predicate, and output values for a particular execution on each row.
3.5 Experimental Results
This section describes the evaluation of the invariant generation and inte-
gration methods described earlier in the thesis. We first provide a brief
description of the experimental setup, and an overview of the tool which we
base our fault injection framework on, Fjalar [32], . We then provide exper-
imental results for error detection coverage: of the total number of errors
of a given type (crash, fail-silent violation, etc.) induced in the application,
the percentage that the generated invariants detect before the error is man-
ifested. This is followed by a discussion of the false positive rate for the
detector, and figures for the overhead of the technique. Finally, an empir-
ical relationship between an assertion’s control-flow coverage and its fault
coverage is explored.
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Table 3.3: Breakdown of total number of fault injections and frequency of
each error type encountered.
Source File
Total
Injections
FSVs Crashes Hangs
Not
Manifested
replace.c 3894 359 1281 8 2246
schedule.c 1407 284 93 84 946
schedule2.c 2824 683 16 40 2085
tot info.c 2926 760 686 0 1480
3.5.1 Experimental setup
We evaluate our method using four applications from the well-known Siemens
benchmarks [25]. Specifically, we use replace.c, a program for regular ex-
pression string replacement, tot info.c, a statistics calculation program,
schedule.c, a scheduling program for tasks of different priorities, and
schedule2.c, a different implementation of the same functionality as
schedule.c.
For each target application, we first generate invariants using PRECIS, as
described in Chapter 2. We use the first 50% of test executions as train-
ing data. We then integrate these invariants into the target applications as
assertions. To measure error coverage, we injected between 2000 and 5000
single-bit errors, one per run, into the checked and unchecked versions of the
application as described in Subsections B and C. A summary of the fault
injection campaign is shown in Table 3.3.
3.5.2 Fault injection framework
We developed a custom fault-injection framework to simulate the effect of
source-level faults on program execution. It is based on Fjalar [32], a tool
developed for binary instrumentation of applications for use with the Daikon
invariant generation engine [14]. Fjalar is itself based on Valgrind [33], an
instrumentation framework that allows for memory analysis of running pro-
grams.
At a high level, the framework is used by generating a tuple (Program
Point, Tag, Variable) specifying when during program execution a target
variable is to be injected. Specifically, Program Point can be the start of
any basic block in the program, Tag is specific to a single execution through
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the program point, and Variable specifies a random source-level variable for
injection. This variable can be a local, global, or formal parameter, and its
value can logically be stored either on the stack, heap, or in static memory.
However, the fault we simulate could happen elsewhere, such as when the
variable is loaded into a register or during computation. When the specified
program point is reached, the target variable is corrupted according to a
predetermined fault model.
Doing fault injection at the source-level allows us to gain insight into
source-level concepts such as which program variables are highly correlated
with certain types of failures. In addition, it allows us to easily reproduce the
same source level fault on different application binaries. This is especially
useful in providing a comparison between binaries with and without the error
detector integrated.
3.5.3 Fault Model
We use fault injection to simulate the effects of transient errors, represented
by single-bit flips on the target variables. The targeted variables can be
any stack variables (not necessarily just those on the top frame), globals, or
heap data pointed to by these variables. To measure the extent to which
the generated assertions detect errors, we first execute the program without
fault injection. The frequency of execution of each program point is captured
and used to determine a set of random injection points, weighted by their
relative frequency of execution, and a random variable valid during each of
those points to be corrupted. For each generated tuple (Program Point, Tag,
Variable), we execute the program twice again, injecting the given fault.
The first injection is unchecked version – the program is executed without
the error detection integrated. The resulting type of error (whether crash,
hang, FSV, or not manifested), is then recorded. The second injection is
on the checked version, with the error detection. If an invariant is triggered
during execution, the error is considered detected.
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Table 3.4: Generated invariant statistics.
Source File
# of Functions
or Loops
# of
Outputs
Avg. # of
Predicates per
Output
replace.c 34 44 2.41
schedule.c 24 82 1.68
schedule2.c 22 90 1.24
tot info.c 21 131 2.00
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Figure 3.3: Crash, FSV, and total error coverage.
3.5.4 Data Fault Coverage
A primary measure of the effectiveness of our method is the proportion of data
errors the generated assertions can detect. To this end, we inject a number
of data faults into checked and unchecked versions of each target application
and record the types of errors manifested. The goal is to catch the errors with
our generated assertions before they can propagate to more serious errors.
Specifically, we evaluate error detection coverage for the following classes of
errors:
• Crashes are the result of faults that cause program execution to end
prematurely, such as through a segmentation fault or permissions vio-
lation.
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• Hangs are faults that cause a program to never finish execution, through
corruption of a loop condition or some other control flow subversion.
• Fail-Silent Violations, or FSVs, results from faults that do not cause
a program to exit irregularly, but manifest through a difference in pro-
gram output from the correct value.
• Non-manifested faults are faults that corrupt some program state
but which do not ultimately cause program output to be any different
from a correct execution.
Statistics for the generated invariants are shown in Table 3.4, and the re-
sulting error coverage is shown in Figure 3.3. The results show that the error
coverage for Fail-silent Violations is relatively high – over 60% in three of the
four applications tested. We found that this is a strong positive result for the
method; FSVs are generally the most insidious type of program misbehavior,
since they often are not immediately apparent to the users of a system and
thus can accumulate over time. The higher rate of detection of FSVs shows
the method’s strength in identifying hardware errors that might otherwise
go undetected.
In contrast, crash coverage for the tested applications is generally low:
for the majority of applications tested the coverage was less than 20%. In
practice we found that this was because the corrupted programs often failed
even before the first assertion was reached. Although this result is not ideal, it
is acceptable; since crashes are often easily identified by a system’s users and
administrator, corrective measures for errors manifesting in crashes would
likely be taken anyway.
We also find that the error detectors caught an average of 48% of faults
that ultimately did not manifest in the unchecked version of the program.
Even though such faults do not cause errors in execution, identifying them
may still be helpful to system administrators. For example, identifying the
presence of faults may help identify problematic hardware on a certain system
before it fails entirely.
Finally, we found statistically significant results for hang-causing faults
for two of the tested applications: schedule and schedule2. For both ap-
plications, the hang coverage was relatively high, over 90%. This indicates
that the generated detectors were effective in identifying faults that caused
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Table 3.5: Time taken to execute the target applications with and without
the error detection integrated.
Source File
Original Time
(s)
Self-checking Time
(s)
Overhead
Factor
replace.c 1.155 4.751 4.113
schedule.c 7.279 8.222 1.130
schedule2.c 9.021 9.932 1.101
Table 3.6: False positive rate for target applications.
Source File % False Positives
replace.c 2.1 %
schedule.c 2.0 %
schedule2.c 1.8 %
tot info.c 1.4 %
stalled execution. Thus, they may be useful in maintaining system uptime
by automatically restarting the system once the error is detected.
In particular, we found that replace.c had considerably different results
than the rest of the tested applications. Both the relative frequency of man-
ifested errors and the error coverage values did not match those of the other
three applications. We theorize this is because of the highly data-intensive
nature of replace. As a string replacement algorithm, any errors in the
state representing text data are likely to manifest as fail-silent violations,
since such errors do not generally subvert control flow. However, PRECIS
does not typically generate invariants on entire arrays, since it generally only
instruments the first element of each array. This explains the lower FSV
coverage encountered. We found crash coverage was higher than the average
mainly because data corruption was less likely to cause an immediate crash
before the error detectors were reached.
3.5.5 False positives
A potential downside to any dynamic technique such as PRECIS is the gen-
eration of spurious invariants: properties which may hold for the training set
but do not for the program in general. We define the invariant generation
false positive rate for each application as the number of spurious invariants
divided by the total number of generated invariants. The false positive rates
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for the target applications are shown in Table 3.6.
3.5.6 Overhead
Since the error detectors are integrated into the application source code,
they have overhead in terms of code size, memory usage, and performance.
Table 3.5 shows the percentage increase in these metrics for the three of the
target applications. Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of this overhead in
instrumented, non-instrumented, and checking functions.
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Figure 3.4: The breakdown of exclusive time spent in various functions in
original and error-detecting versions of each target application. (a) and (b)
show the distribution for replace, (c) and (d) for schedule, and (e) and
(f) show the distribution for schedule2.
The CPU overhead varies considerably between applications. Among the
applications tested, replace.c proved to require the largest increase in exe-
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cution time. This is understandable when the location of the detector logic is
considered. Since replace tends to have complex loop structures with mul-
tiple nested loops and control flow inside these loops, the assertion-checking
code tends to be more complex and add a significant number of instructions
to the most frequently executed regions of code. In contrast, schedule.c
and schedule2.c have very different implementations, but both have rela-
tively simple inner loops. This means the detectors do not add significant
overhead.
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Figure 3.5: Crash, FSV, and total c overage as path coverage is increased.
3.5.7 Path coverage as a means to predict fault coverage
As discussed earlier in the thesis, the assertions generated through our tech-
nique are path specific. This means that it is possible to ascertain their path
coverage: the proportion of program paths in which the invariants take ef-
fect. In terms of the instrumented code, this is equivalent to the proportion
of program paths for which the assert statement will be evaluated for a
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particular output. Assertions with high coverage will cover a large propor-
tion of the program paths in a function, and the opposite for low-coverage
assertions. If path coverage correlates with fault coverage, a possible advan-
tage to our technique would be to qualitatively judge a detector for fault
coverage without time-consuming fault injection experiments. To obtain the
degree of correlation for our target applications, we designed an experiment
to measure the degree to which fault coverage varies if we control for path
coverage.
Specifically, we created three versions of replace.c. The first, version
is identical to the fully checked version used elsewhere in this section. It
has high path coverage: 94.4%. We modified this file to create a medium-
coverage version with approximately 50% path coverage, and another with
15% path coverage. We then injected faults into each of them, and recorded
the crash coverage, FSV coverage, and total fault coverage for each. The
results are shown in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5 shows a clear correlation between path coverage and error cov-
erage. With 15% path coverage, replace-low detects slightly over 25% of
manifested errors. In contrast, replace-high detects over 45% of errors.
Intuitively, this correlation makes sense. If an assertion checks a higher per-
centage of paths, it is more likely to catch an error.
3.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter describes a novel technique to derive function-level invariants
and integrate them into applications as error detectors. The invariants that
comprise the error detectors exhibit high specificity, as seen through the
discussion on tightness.
Experimental fault injections show that the generated detectors have high
error detection coverage for fail-silent violations (FSVs) and hangs. Fur-
thermore, they have a low false positive rate for the applications tested. In
addition, the path-specificity of the generated detectors allows for an easy
gauge of the expected error detection coverage; experiments show that high
path coverage assertions tend to have high error coverage. This is useful in
evaluating error detectors without setting up a costly and/or time-consuming
fault injection framework.
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CHAPTER 4
APPLYING PRECIS FOR BUG
LOCALIZATION AND REGRESSION
DETECTION
Previous chapters have introduced PRECIS as a technique for automatic in-
variant generation. PRECIS uses static program path information guided
statistical analysis to generate invariants. These invariants are computation-
ally inexpensive and capture meaningful relationships between path predi-
cates and outputs of a function. Section 2.5 showed PRECIS invariants to
be demonstrably more valuable than other invariant generation techniques
[14, 17, 15] in terms of expressiveness, coverage and scalability.
In this chapter, we present two novel, significant applications for PRECIS
invariants during different phases of the software development life cycle – (a)
for regression testing and (b) during bug localization. We call the umbrella
technology driving the application of PRECIS predicates and invariants as
PREAMBL (PREdicate Analysis for Multi-phase Bug Location).
PREAMBL uses the invariants generated by PRECIS to locate bugs in
the regression testing phase during development, and the predicates as well
as invariants of PRECIS for bug localization in the post deployment phase.
PREAMBL for Regression Testing
Regression testing involves determining if program behavior has changed be-
tween versions. The goal is to identify regressions, i.e., program functionality
that was correct in a previous version and incorrect in a current version. Re-
gression testing is often done by creating a set of test cases and expected
outputs which cover the expected behavior of the program [34, 35]. These
test cases are then run whenever the program has changed. In practice, how-
ever, maintaining and updating a comprehensive test set is highly time and
labor intensive [35, 36].
With PREAMBL, we introduce the idea of using invariants for regres-
sion testing. Invariants summarize key relationships and functionality of the
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program. They can be thought of as detailed specifications of the program
intent. While each test can exercise only a single program execution, each
invariant can correspond to a set of executions. Hence satisfaction of an
invariant in successive versions of a program is a more comprehensive check
than traditional testing. Additionally, in regressions, tests would capture
input/output equivalence between versions. In contrast, invariants provide a
behavioral or functional check. Invariants for regression testing are intended
to complement, not replace traditional regression test suites in any way.
However, the tradeoff with using invariants for regression testing is that un-
like tests, they do not port easily across versions. We describe a methodology
to apply PRECIS invariants for regression testing in Figure 4.1. The princi-
ple we use is that invariants from a previous version (n) should be satisfied,
i.e. hold true in its next version (n+1). Hence, porting of invariants is only
relevant between two successive versions. For such a pair of versions, invari-
ants from version n undergo a check for whether they are admissible in n+1.
Each invariant generated by PRECIS expresses a function output as a linear
combination of function inputs, predicated on some program paths. Every
PRECIS invariant has a reference source code, from which it was inferred.
If this reference source code is unchanged in version n+1, the invariant can
be used. We can detect this case automatically in PREAMBL. If there are
name changes to input/output variables or predicates in a reference source
code, but the functionality is intended to be retained, then annotations can
be provided by the programmer. Such annotations are very specific and quick
in PREAMBL. In the case that the output computation changes in n+1, but
the control flow structure remains the same as n, the PRECIS invariant can
be used to detect the regression. In the case that the control flow structure
of the reference code changes, the invariant will not be admissible for version
n+1.
If an admissible invariant fails, then it can mean that a regression has been
detected. Alternately, it can mean that a bug from version n was fixed in ver-
sion n+1. The programmer can inspect the invariant to judge this, and then
regenerate it for version n+2 using the corrected n+1 version. If an invariant
is not admissible in n+1, it can be regenerated from the changed source code
in n+1, for use in n+2. It should be noted that the unsoundness of PRE-
CIS invariants does not affect its application to regression testing, since the
faithfulness between two successive versions is being checked, not absolute
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correctness of these invariants. We present a case study demonstrating the
use of PREAMBL in regression testing in Section 4.4.
PRECIS invariants are very aptly suited for regression testing. PRECIS
generates invariants independently at the function level. Hence, it only re-
quires source code for individual functions in the case of limited access. Also,
a user has the option to selectively generate invariants only for functions of
interest. This is an inherently scalable usage model. In contrast to dynamic
techniques that generate inequalities or range based invariants, PRECIS gen-
erates strict equalities, that are obviously more specific and accurate. Since
invariants are generated at function interfaces, they are more easily trans-
ferred between program versions.
PREAMBL for Bug Localization
Bug localization attempts to answer a simple question: given a program mis-
behavior (bug), which lines of code cause it? Identifying the cause of a bug
in program code is often a time-consuming part of debugging, so several au-
tomatic techniques have been proposed to give developers information about
locations in code highly correlated to the buggy behavior [19, 21, 20].
Assertion checks are typically removed from a program when it is released,
due to the overhead caused by those checks. Thus, instead of integrating
assertions into release code, PREAMBL performs a lightweight instrumen-
tation of program branch points.
Our vision of PREAMBL for post-deployment bug localization and anal-
ysis is shown in Figure 4.2. In the case of a failure, the sequence of branch
points leading to the crash is used to decipher the program path that resulted
in the crash. We describe a statistical analysis that identifies which program
subpaths are most highly correlated with failure. The statistical analysis
takes into account the proportion of total failures occur on that path and
the percentage of executions through that path that result in failure. Our
analysis uses a path frequency tree to identify the maximum importance sub-
paths. Hence, we are able to determine subpaths of varying lengths. Highly
correlated subpaths can be presented to developers directly to aid in debug-
ging. This assists in localizing the bug in a smaller, more relevant region,
than searching through the entire path during debug. A failing path can be
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Figure 4.1: PREAMBL: Automated regression testing.
associated with the corresponding PRECIS invariant(s) that summarized it
in the pre-deployment phase. From the invariants, the developer will have
information about the inputs, outputs and variables defined along that path.
This provides more information than is normally available during the debug-
ging phase. Since PRECIS invariants summarize behavior along a path, they
can greatly enhance program understanding, especially for maintenance of
legacy code or for a programmer dealing with an unfamiliar code base. In
addition, examining why a buggy invariant passed or a bug free one failed
can reveal insights about the errors in the program.
The scalability of PREAMBL is not a major concern, since it is based on
a dynamic, statistical methodology which does not perform any exhaustive
analysis. Also, the PRECIS invariant generation is only within a function,
making it easy to scale. Hence, our results are presented at a function level
for regression testing and bug localization.
To summarize, this chapter makes the following contributions:
• Regression detection using invariants. We present a method for in-
tegrating automatically generated invariants into program code (Sec-
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tion 4.1). We show a case study illustrating its benefit in identifying
regressions (Subsection 4.4.1).
• Subpath to invariant association. We present a method for mapping
program subpaths identified by bug localization to automatically gen-
erated invariants (Section 4.2.4). We show that this information can be
used to identify the root cause of a bug more effectively than existing
approaches (Subsection 4.4.2).
• Inter-procedural path-based bug localization. We present a novel bug
localization technique that captures inter-procedural program paths
(Section 4.2), and demonstrate its ability to localize bugs that exist-
ing path-based techniques cannot (Subsection 4.4.2). We evaluate its
effectiveness in localizing bugs in several open-source applications (Sec-
tion 4.5.4).
• Extension and automation of PRECIS. We present the framework for
automating the PRECIS tool, as well as its extensions to generic C/C++
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constructs (Section 4.1).
4.1 Regression Testing
Automatically generated invariants provide a compact way of representing
the behavior of a function or program. Whereas a single test case checks the
behavior of a program for a single point in the input space, a PRECIS invari-
ant validates the output for all input values following a particular program
path. This means PRECIS invariants can much more compactly express a
large set of program behavior. If an invariant generated for an earlier version
of the program fails on a new version, then we have detected a regression.
However, unlike test cases, invariants are not inherently portable between
program versions. Variables are added and removed, control structure is
altered, and code is shifted. Therefore, a mapping has to be made, where
possible, between the semantics of the original invariant expression and the
those used in the new version. For an invariant to be admissible for a new
version of a program, all predicates, inputs, and outputs referenced in that
invariant must have a mapping.
In practice, most predicates do not change in a new version of a program.
We automatically map such predicates to the corresponding old-version pred-
icates using a string literal match. A map is created between the matching
strings that are closest in position in the old and new source files.
At times, however, the expression of a predicate is changed between ver-
sions. In this case, PRECIS relies on annotations given by the programmer
to describe the intent behind the change. If the change in the predicate ex-
pression is not intended to change the meaning of a particular branch point,
the programmer can annotate the predicate as being equivalent to a given
predicate in an earlier version. One example of this might be prefixing a
branch expression with a null pointer check to solve a null dereferencing bug.
This will create a mapping between predicates, even if their constituent ex-
pressions are different. If the programmer intends to change the behavior of
the predicate, then no annotation would be necessary, and invariants using
that predicate would be dropped.
A variable name change may need a programmer annotation depending
on the type of variable. If the variable is an intermediate variable (not an
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input or output as defined by PRECIS), it does not need a mapping because
it will not appear directly in generated invariants. For input and output
variables, a mapping similar to that for predicates is created. The current
implementation PRECIS requires programmers to explicitly denote input or
output variables which have changed. However, in practice, this can be done
automatically using refactoring tools built into most IDEs. For example
Visual Studio and Eclipse both support a variable renaming operation that
renames all references to a declared variable. This can be extended to update
the mapping maintained by PRECIS.
Overall, we describe the three cases that can result from mapping an in-
variant, depending on the degree of programmer effort required for them to
be admissible in a new version:
• Case 1: invariants can be mapped between two versions fully automat-
ically. This is the case if all predicates can be mapped automatically,
and no input or output variables change names.
• Case 2: invariants require some programmer effort to be valid in the
new versions. This may be due to an annotation required for a predi-
cate, or an input or output variable name change.
• Case 3: invariants cannot be mapped between versions, due to funda-
mental code changes. For example, if a predicate or variable referred to
in the original invariant is removed altogether from the program, then
no valid mapping for the invariant can be created.
We explore the frequency of each of these cases and the resulting coverage
in Section 4.5.
4.2 Bug Localization
While invariants are often effective in identifying bugs during software de-
velopment, they are usually disabled for release to end-users due to their
execution overhead. Rather than evaluating full-form invariants as in PRE-
CIS, PREAMBL supports the conditional instrumentation of predicates in
released applications to localize bugs. PREAMBL then analyzes the captured
program path data to localize bugs to certain subpaths in the application.
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Once localized, these bugs are associated with invariants generated by PRE-
CIS. This gives the developer improved context to diagnose and fix bugs.
The following section provides detail on the methodology of the approach.
4.2.1 Capturing path data
PREAMBL captures path profiles by instrumenting control flow branch points
(if statements, case statements, etc.) as predicates, using the same criteria
as PRECIS. Thus, predicates correspond to nodes in the control flow graph,
and the value of the predicate represents the direction through the graph.
During program execution, the value of each predicate is recorded as the cor-
responding branch is executed. Taken together for a program run, a sequence
of predicates and their values represents the path taken through the program.
In this thesis, we will use the format: (p0 = v0) ⇒ ... ⇒ (pn−1 = vn−1) to
indicate a program path that takes the p0 branch if v0 = 1 and does not if
v0 = 0, then evaluates a number of other predicates, and finally evaluates the
pn−1 branch to be the value vn−1. Each such sequence is marked as Succeeded
or Failed, depending on the status of the given execution.
To quantitatively score paths, PREAMBL uses the algorithm originally
proposed by [19] and also used by [21]. In this algorithm, we collect four
measurements for each path p:
• So(p): The number of successful runs in which the path p was observed.
• Fo(p): The number of failed runs in which the path p was observed.
• Se(p): The number of successful runs in which the path p was executed.
• Fe(p): The number of failed runs in which the path p was executed.
A path is considered executed if all of its constituent predicates were eval-
uated to their specified value. It is observed if the first predicate in the path
was evaluated, whether or not the result was the one corresponding to the
start of the path. Using these measures and F , the total number of failed
executions, we calculate four scores to quantitatively judge to what degree a
path is likely the cause of a bug.
Sensitivity(p) =
log(Fe(p))
log(F )
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Context(p) =
Fo(p)
Fo(p) + So(p)
Increase(p) =
Fe(p)
Fe(p) + Se(p)
− Context(p)
Importance(p) =
2
1
Increase(p)
+ 1
Sensitivity(p)
At a high level, Sensitivity(p) for some path p assigns a score between 0
and 1 depending on the proportion of failures when p was executed relative
to the number of total failures. Increase(p) for some path p measures the
proportion of executions of p that were associated with a failure, corrected
by the proportion of failures on all subpaths of p with one fewer edge.
The goal of PREAMBL is to identify program paths p which are executed
in a large proportion of all failures (Sensitivity(p)) and when executed re-
sult in failure much often then when they are observed and not executed
(Increase(p)). We balance both of these criteria through the Importance
metric, by finding paths that maximize the harmonic mean of Sensitivity(p)
and Increase(p).
4.2.2 Building the path frequency tree
In order to efficiently generate variable-length paths, PREAMBL must be
able to quickly determine So(p), Fo(p), Se(p), and Fe(p) values for any path.
To do this, it generates a path frequency tree for each observed predicate.
Each path frequency tree Tpi is a data structure that holds the number of
times a path starting with some predicate pi is executed in both failed runs,
Fe(p), and succeeded runs, Se(p).
Under the root node for the tree is a node for each observed value for
pi. In general, each node in the tree represents the value of single predicate
(pk = vk) in a program path. The parent of the node is the predicate value
that immediately preceded the node in the path. Each child represents a
predicate value executed directly after the current one. As we read each
executed path from the path trace file, we increment counters for Se(p) and
Fe(p) on each node as we traverse the tree for the given path. In addition,
we increment a tree-level counter for either So(p) or Fo(p), depending on
whether the execution was a success or failure. The end result for each
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predicate frequency tree Tpi after processing all paths is final counts on each
node for Se(p) and Fe(p) for the path starting at pi and ending on that node,
and counts for So(p) and Fo(p) for paths starting with pi.
To lookup these values for a path (px = vx) ⇒ (py = vy) ⇒ ... ⇒ (pz =
vz), PREAMBL would first begin by finding the path frequency tree for px.
We would then traverse the tree, starting from the child of the root node
px = vx, to the child node py = vy, and continue traversing the tree until
we reached the node corresponding to pz = vz. The measures for Se(p)
and Fe(p) stored at this node would indicate how many times the path was
executed in successful and failed runs, respectively. We can use these values
and So(p) and Fo(p) stored at the root node to calculate Increase, Sensitivity,
and Importance for the path.
Generating the path frequency tree has a computational complexity of
O(n × l2), where n is the number of paths captured and l is the maximum
length of these paths. In practice, PREAMBL takes less than a minute to
analyze all tested applications.
4.2.3 Generating high-importance subpaths
Once a path frequency tree is generated for each predicate, we traverse the
tree searching for the maximal-Importance paths. Specifically, for each node
we calculate Increase(p). Nodes corresponding to paths with Increase <
0 are immediately discarded. Others are added to a priority queue which
ranks paths by their Importance score. This process continues until all path
frequency trees are fully analyzed. At this point, the top results can be
queried from the priority queue. The worst-case efficiency of this process is
O(n log(n)), where n is the number of distinct paths captured.
4.2.4 Mapping bugs to invariants
The top-scoring paths will likely tell a developer where a bug is in program
code but not necessarily what is going wrong. Thus, PREAMBL links this
localization information with the invariants generated by PRECIS. These
invariants summarize what the expected output behavior is, and so allow
the developer to understand what code is computing more succinctly than
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re-reading the program code. Furthermore, since the generated invariants
are path-specific, only those specific to the failing path are shown. If the
invariants capture undesirable behavior, having the behavior summarized in
the form of an invariant may make it easier for the developer to identify
a problem with implementation. If the invariant appears correct, it can
be checked by the developer by reproducing failed program runs. Since it is
possible that the original test suite did not cover the failing path, re-checking
invariants specifically for failing runs may identify which variable is violating
expected behavior.
4.2.5 User-driven debugging
Previous bug localization work has usually focused on sending reports after
program crashes. Crashes are an important set of bugs, and are well-suited
for automatic localization because they are easy to automatically detect.
However, many bugs lie in other misbehavior, such as incorrect output. In
practice, these types of bugs are more difficult to programmatically detect,
so PREAMBL implements user-driven debugging to allow program end-users
identify misbehaving executions and submit bug reports containing path data
labeled for both buggy and successful executions. This allows applications
with a large set of motivated but possibly non-technical users to aid in de-
bugging, and allows them to contribute directly to fixing a bug that affects
themselves.
In PREAMBL, user-driven debugging works by encapsulating a command-
line program in a script. This script first executes the program with path
instrumentation enabled. After the program completes, the user is prompted
as to whether the execution was successful or buggy. Depending on the user’s
answer, the path captured for the execution is marked as succeeded or failed.
A number of such labeled paths can be generated by a single user and sent
as part of a bug report. Multiple users having the same issue can combine
their path traces for further improvement in localization.
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Figure 4.3: The flow of PREAMBL that includes PRECIS as discussed in
this thesis. First, PRECIS is used to generate invariants for a version N of
the target application. These invariants can be used to regression test the
next version, N+1, of the application. On release, PREAMBL is used to
localize bugs to high-Importance program paths. These program paths are
then associated with the generated invariants to provide the developer with
localized variables.
4.3 Implementation
A high-level flow of the methodology discussed in this thesis is shown in
Figure 4.3.
We instrument our programs to capture inputs and outputs for PRECIS.
The instrumentation environment uses Fjalar [32], a tool based on Valgrind
[33], initially developed to support invariant generation in DAIKON. We
extend Fjalar to handle pointers, loops, and loops. In order to capture values
of predicates, we perform source to source transformations. We consider
only path conditionals as predicates in this work. For every if-else and case
statement, we substitute the statement content with function calls that log
the value of the if-statement. If a path is taken during a program execution,
the predicate corresponding to that path thus gets recorded.
An important feature of a truly automated invariant generation engine is
automatic integration of the generated invariants into program code. With-
out this, programmers would be required to examine each generated invariant
and manually add a check for it. This is especially true for invariants tar-
geting regressions; a set of invariants comprehensive enough to detect most
regressions would necessarily be verbose.
To extend PRECIS to automatically detect regressions, we define a machine-
readable format for generated invariants. For every output, the generated in-
variants specify how the output can be expressed as a linear combination of
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inputs. Although we derive linear relationships in our implementation, it is
possible to derive quadratic/cubic relationships as well. This is orthogonal to
the method itself. The invariant file is read into the Fjalar tool. If during the
execution of a program, an invariant fails, the failing invariant is reported,
as is the stack trace that caused the failure. This is more information than
simply providing binary information about a program crashing or not. An
example for the type of information that can be retrieved using PRECIS is
shown in Section 4.4.1.
In order to capture the path profiles for bug localization, we use a similar
framework for capturing predicates. This is more lightweight, since we do
not need to capture inputs and outputs. Instead of executing the application
program inside Fjalar, we add a function call from the branches that records
if a path was taken or not. Hence, the format of the captured predicates is
the same, but the overhead required to run the bug localization is much less
than PRECIS.
4.4 Case Studies
We explain the benefits to our approach using two case studies; one for
each phase of the software lifecycle: development and release. To show
PREAMBL’s benefit to software in active development, we provide a case
study of a hypothetical scientific computing application. We give an exam-
ple of a possible regression that might occur during development. We show
that PREAMBL is effective in detecting the regression, and provides useful
data to the developer as to its root cause. We also show the effectiveness
of PREAMBL on post-release software by showing how it localizes a post-
release bug and associates it with generated invariants.
4.4.1 Regression Detection
Figure 4.4 shows an implementation of the function convert units in a
hypothetical scientific computing application. The intended behavior is sim-
ple: the function is passed three arguments, value, which is the measured
value, src, an enumeration which represents the passed value’s unit of mea-
surement, and tgt, which is the unit of measurement to be converted to.
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int convert_units(int val, Unit src, Unit tgt){
int result = val;
if (src == YD && tgt == IN) { //p0
result *= 36;
//Overflow check:
if (val != result/36) { //p1
result = -1;
}
} else {
result = -1;
}
return result;
}
Figure 4.4: A unit conversion function that might be part of a scientific
computing application. This first, correct implementation is the basis for
automatically generated invariants by PRECIS.
The returned value is the input value converted to the corresponding value
in the target unit of measurement. The function has checks in place to catch
the case of integer overflow, and to catch unsupported conversions. In both
cases, the function returns −1, which is considered an invalid value.
The function convert units is tested thoroughly, and is released in the
first version of the application. At this point, PRECIS is run on the appli-
cation, and the following invariants are captured for convert units:
(p0 = 1 ∧ p1 = 0)⇒ (result = 36× val)
(p0 = 1 ∧ p1 = 1)⇒ (result = −1)
(p0 = 0 ∧ p1 = X)⇒ (result = −1)
These invariants represent the derived functional specifications for convert units.
Any future changes to the function will be judged against this baseline.
Let us suppose the developer is now working on the next version of the
application. The developer wants to make the code more generic. Rather
than hard-coding 36 as the conversion ratio between yards and inches, the
developer defines it as a preprocessor macro and uses this definition in all
relevant conversion code. This new version is shown in Figure 4.5. Unbe-
knownst to the developer, the ratio YD TO IN has been defined incorrectly as
35.
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#define YD_TO_IN 35
int convert_units(int val, Unit src, Unit tgt){
int result = val;
if (src == YD && tgt == IN) { //p0
result *= YD_TO_IN;
//Overflow check:
if (val == result/YD_TO_IN) { //p1
result = -1;
}
} else {
result = -1;
}
return result;
}
Figure 4.5: A second version of the unit conversion function. In attempting
to make the function more generic, the developer has introduced a bug by
defining the conversion ratio incorrectly.
When the developer runs the test suite, the second and third invariants
will not trigger, as the behavior under those circumstances has not changed.
However, the first invariant will trigger, as when the first if statement is
taken and the second is not, the result is not 36 × val. This quickly alerts
the developer to the bug in the code. More importantly, unlike a simple
comparison of output values for the application, the failed assertion also tells
the developer specifically which function output (in this case convert unit’s
result is problematic, but under what conditions (a yard to inch conversion
with no overflow) it is failing. This helps the developer quickly and effectively
isolate the bug.
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4.4.2 User-driven bug localization
int convert_units(int val, Unit src, Unit tgt){
int result = val;
if (src == YD && tgt == IN) { //p0
result *= YD_TO_IN;
//Overflow check:
if (val == result/YD_TO_IN) { //p1
result = -1;
}
} else {
result = -1;
}
return result;
}
void handle_input(){
...
if (task == UNIT_CONVERSION){ //p2
long in_val = input();
long out_val =
convert_units(in_val, in_u, out_u);
if (result != -1) { //p3
printf("%ld %s", out_val, str(out_u));
} else {
printf("Could not convert\n");
}
}
...
}
Figure 4.6: Two functions, convert units and handle input. One
functionality of handle input is to convert a specified value between two
units of measurement. However, there is a mismatch in implementation:
handle input passes a long but convert units expects an int. Under
certain circumstances, this may cause an overflow where the converted
value is not correct.
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paths marked
Path So(p) Fo(p) Se(p) Fe(p) Inc(p) Sens(p) Imp(p)
(p2 = 1)⇒ (p0 = 1)⇒ (p1 = 0) 424 40 64 40 0.298 1.000 0.460
(p2 = 1)⇒ (p0 = 1) 424 40 71 40 0.274 1.000 0.430
(p2 = 1) 424 40 80 40 0.247 1.000 0.396
(p0 = 1)⇒ (p1 = 0) 475 40 426 40 0.008 1.000 0.0162
(p1 = 0) 452 40 426 40 0.005 1.000 0.009
(p0 = 1) 475 40 452 40 0.004 1.000 0.007
(c) Ranking of derived program paths
Figure 4.7: Example of the analysis done by PREAMBL on the code
snippet shown in Figure 4.6. (a) shows the constructed path frequency tree
for an example test suite. Predicates not explicitly defined in Figure 4.6 are
not shown. In (b) the paths that are candidates for localization are colored
red. (c) shows the metrics used in calculating the Importance(p) of each
candidate path.
We also show how PREAMBL helps in debugging released applications
through an example. Consider a user of the same simple open-source scientific
computing application discussed in Section 4.4.1, who notices an intermittent
bug which is affecting the results. This user does not know how to program
and is not at all familiar with the codebase, so diagnosing the issue is difficult.
However, the user is interested in helping the developers identify the bug, and
so enables PREAMBL path instrumentation on the application.
Once path instrumentation is enabled, the user continues using the appli-
cation normally. At the end of each execution, the user labels the execution
as buggy or normal, depending on whether the bug manifested. By reproduc-
ing the bug several times, the user builds two path data files: one containing
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buggy path traces and one containing normal path traces. Once the user feels
the bug has been reproduced a sufficient number of times, the user submits
a bug report, sending both files to the developer for further analysis.
Unknown to the developer at the time, the bug the user is encountering
is due to an occasional integer overflow in the same unit conversion function
discussed in Section 4.4.1, shown in Figure 4.6. The developer has now
fixed the function so it uses the correct conversion ratio. However, a newly
constructed function, handle input() passes a long, rather than an int
for the value to be converted. If the value is large enough, and on certain
architectures where long and int are not represented by the same number
of bits, this can cause an overflow. In other words, the value held by val will
not be the same numeric value that was held in in val.
Once the developer receives the bug report, the developer automatically
localizes the bug by running PREAMBL on the data. In the following section,
we will show how PREAMBL is able to localize the bug to the interaction
between the handle input and convert units functions.
Building the path tree
The first step in PREAMBL is to construct a path tree that stores the fre-
quency of each executed path in both successful and failed executions. To do
this, PREAMBL reads the path trace files and increments the corresponding
path frequency tree nodes for each path it sees. An abridged version of the
path tree is shown in Figure 4.7(a).
Once the path frequency tree is constructed, the path derivation process
starts. Starting from length-1 paths, PREAMBL traverses the tree for nodes
with increasing values for Increase(p) as described in Section 4.2. The
paths represented by these nodes, depicted in Figure 4.7(b) and listed in
Figure 4.7(c), represent the paths most highly correlated with the bug. In
this case, we can see that the highest ranking path is (p2 = 1)⇒ (p0 = 1)⇒
(p1 = 0). This accurately matches the observation that the bug manifests
when convert units is called from within the if statement p2 and a valid
non-overflowing conversion is performed.
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Table 4.1: A brief description of each application tested.
Application
Lines of
Code
Buggy
Versions
Description
replace 564 7 Performs pattern match-
ing and substitutions on
strings.
schedule 412 9 Schedules tasks based on
priority.
schedule2 323 9 Alternate implementa-
tion of schedule.
tot info 565 7 Computes statistics
given input data.
space 6199 8 Interprets an Array Defi-
nition Language.
gzip 7447 7 Compression / decom-
pression program.
Associating paths with invariants
In order to further help the developer identify what is the problem in code
rather than simply where it is, PREAMBL automatically associates the local-
ized path with invariants previously generated for that path. In this example,
an invariant generated for convert units() is:
(p0 = 1 ∧ p1 = 0)⇒ (result == 36× result).
Since this invariant describes the behavior of result on the path that
the bug was localized to, it is associated with the bug and presented to the
developer. Thus, PREAMBL presents both the localized path for the bug
and the corresponding expected behavior to the developer. In this case,
the developer may immediately notice the type mismatch between the long
passed to convert units and the int type used.
4.5 Experimental Results
The experiments in this thesis are focused on answering the following ques-
tions about PREAMBL:
• What is the quality of invariants generated by PRECIS?
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• What proportion of regressions can PREAMBL detect?
• How effective is the bug localization technique used in PREAMBL in
localizing bugs?
4.5.1 SIR applications
To judge the effectiveness of PREAMBL in localizing bugs, we test it on
several applications in the Software-artifact Infrastructure Repository (SIR)
[37]: a set of applications from the Siemens suite [25] and space [38]. We use
the SIR as a standardized repository of applications and bugs to compare
with previous bug detection tools [19, 21]. A brief description of each target
application can be found in Table 4.1.
4.5.2 Invariant quality
Table 4.2: A summary of generated invariant quality.
Invariants CFG Coverage FP Rate
replace 48 45.7% 2.1%
schedule 104 82.8% 3.8%
schedule2 97 78.0% 5.5%
totinfo 161 84.3% 5.5%
space 1583 91.4% 7.6%
gzip 1281 49.9% 3.3%
We first examine the quality of the invariants generated by PRECIS for the
tested applications. This is done by running one-third of the available test
suite on each application to generate trace data, then performing predicate
clustering to derive a set of invariants. Table 4.2 summarizes the results.
The number of invariants generated grows proportionally with the size of
the program, but varies considerably even for similarly sized programs. We
found this had to with each programs structure. For example, programs
which make heavy use of global variables tend to have a high number of
invariants generated, as the number of function outputs is higher.
We define an invariants control-flow graph (CFG) coverage to be the per-
centage of program paths in which the invariant is triggered. Coverage ranged
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considerably between applications, and was highest for control-flow oriented
programs where data flow could mostly be described through linear opera-
tors.
We also examine the degree to which the generated invariants are spurious.
Specifically, we define an invariant false positive rate to be the percentage
of invariants generated by PRECIS, on one third of the test set, which are
invalidated when running the full test set. PRECIS has a low false positive
rate for generated invariants: less than 10
4.5.3 Regression detection
Table 4.3: Metrics for the effectiveness of regression testing.
Admissible In-
variants w/o
Annotations
Admissible In-
variants w/
Annotations
Detection Cov-
erage
replace 82.4% 85.7% 56.6%
schedule 98.5% 99.9% 55.6%
schedule2 95.75% 96.4% 33.3%
space 100% 100% 62.5%
gzip 100% 100% 57.1%
We next evaluate the usefulness of PREAMBL for regression testing. We
do this through the use of buggy program versions included with each of the
applications tested. The first step is to generate invariants for the correct
version of the program. Then, for each buggy version, we map all invariant
predicates, inputs, and outputs to the corresponding value in new version.
The average proportion of invariants that are admissible to the new version,
with and without user annotation, is shown in the first two columns of Table
4.3.
To evaluate whether the invariants are effective in detecting regressions,
we run the test suite while checking the generated invariants. If any invariant
evaluates to false during a test run, then we have detected the regression.
The resulting regression detection coverage results are shown in Table 4.3.
While the percentage of admissible invariants is high (all tested applica-
tions had higher than 80%), there is range between the highest and lowest-
scoring applications. In particular, replace had the lowest score without an-
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notations, at 82.4%. This was due to a high proportion of control-flow centric
bugs encountered. Since changes to control flow require annotation, replace
had an especially low proportion of invariants which could be transferred to
the next version. In contrast, space had a high proportion of data-flow bugs.
Consequently, a high proportion of invariants were admissible to the next
version.
Detection also varied considerably between applications. In general, ap-
plications with a higher proportion of admissible invariants tended to have
higher detection coverage. This is intuitive; the more invariants can be ap-
plied to the next program version, the more likely that one will catch the
regression. However, the detection coverage is ultimately limited by the
manifestation of the bug; if the regression is in a program output that is not
captured by any invariant, then the detection coverage will be lower. For
example, several regressions in schedule2 involved wrong output from printf
statements. Since the output of such statements is not checked by invariants,
the detection coverage for schedule2 was much lower than other applications.
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show a detailed breakdown of two representative appli-
cations: replace and schedule. In both applications, the majority of buggy
versions have modifications from the original version that fall into either
Case 1 or Case 2 as defined in Section 4.1. Both the percentage of admissi-
ble invariants and the detection coverage is highest for Case 1 modifications.
This is intuitive, as invariants affected by such changes can be automatically
mapped between versions. PREAMBL has reduced coverage for Case 2 mod-
ifications; during such changes PREAMBL needs programmer annotations
to identify equivalent predicates or variables between versions. Finally, Case
3 modifications show the lowest detection percentages. This is because such
modifications mean the relevant invariants cannot be admissible, and so the
likelihood of detecting a regression through them is very low.
4.5.4 Bug localization
We evaluate the effectiveness of the path-based localization technique used
by PREAMBL, and measure what percent of localized bugs can be associ-
ated with invariant information. To do this, we measure the percentage of
these bugs that can be localized to a specific subpath, and provide aggregate
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Table 4.4: Detailed breakdown by case of regression testing effectiveness for
replace. For Case 2 and Case 3, the values shown are the percentages of
admissible invariants assuming no annotation. x%/y% represent the
percent of admissible invariants in the affected function and overall,
respectively. The detection coverage value assumes annotation.
replace
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Proportion of Cases 3/7 3/7 1/7
Admissible Invariants 100% 0%/92.3% 0%/90%
Detection Coverage 66% 55% 0%
Table 4.5: Detailed breakdown by case of regression testing effectiveness for
schedule. For Case 2 and Case 3, the values shown are the percentages of
admissible invariants assuming no annotation. x%/y% represent the
percent of admissible invariants in the affected function and overall,
respectively. The detection coverage value assumes annotation.
schedule
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Proportion of Cases 4/9 4/9 1/9
Admissible Invariants 100% 8.25%/96.8% 66%/99%
Detection Coverage 75% 50% 0%
information on the specificity of these subpaths.
Localization quality
Profiling multi-procedure, variable-length paths allows PREAMBL to bet-
ter localize bugs to relevant paths. We compare PREAMBL to previously
proposed profiling schemes: the fixed-length intraprocedural path used in
[21], and a simple single-branch profiling scheme. All three techniques are
scored by the average importance score for the top five derived paths. Ta-
ble 4.6 shows the aggregated results on several benchmarks. In each case,
PREAMBL generates higher-scoring results.
We also discuss the average path length for highly ranked paths in both
PREAMBL and fixed-path profiling. Figure 4.8 shows the distribution of
path lengths for both. On average, PREAMBL tends to generate shorter
paths than fixed-path profiling. This indicates that path-length is optimized
to not include predicates that are not relevant to the failure. Since it also on
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Table 4.6: The average Importance score for the best-scoring paths using
PREAMBL, fixed path profiling, and branch profiling. In all tested
applications, PREAMBL derives higher-Importance paths.
space replace schedule tot info
PREAMBL 0.640 0.502 0.553 0.636
Fixed path 0.537 0.310 0.196 0.585
Branch 0.419 0.138 0.121 0.260
average generates higher Importance paths, shorter paths are preferable for
developers: the fewer blocks of code developers need to inspect to identify
the bug, the better.
Figure 4.8: The distribution of path length in top-scoring paths for both
PREAMBL and a fixed-path profiling technique. A higher proportion of
PREAMBL-generated paths are shorter, which indicates more effective
localization.
4.6 Chapter Summary
In conclusion, this chapter proposes a technique, PREAMBL, to unite two
principal aspects of software reliability and debugging. Instead of dividing
the program debugging into water-tight pre-release and post-release phases,
we propose a flow where debugging information from these phases can be
used synergistically. Using this technology, both the invariant generation
and bug localization are made path-centric. Thus, focused information can
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be given to the developer for bug identification and repair. The generated
invariants may be used beyond regression testing, for both bug association
and providing context. Passing invalid invariants and failing valid invariants
can be used to help a developer identify logical bugs instantly through the
reuse of invariant information from the pre-release phase.
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CHAPTER 5
RELATED WORK
This chapter discusses previous work related to the topics discussed in this
thesis. The chapter is divided into three sections. Section 5.1 describes
previous work in automatic invariant generation and compares it to PRECIS.
Section 5.2 describes related work in automatically generating error detectors.
Finally, section 5.3 describes related bug localization work and compares it
to PREAMBL.
5.1 Invariant Generation
Various approaches for automatic invariant generation for programs have
been proposed, involving both dynamic [14, 15] and static [17, 18] approaches.
In this section, we discuss key differences between PRECIS and several of
these related techniques.
5.1.1 DIDUCE
DIDUCE [15] is an online technique to learn invariants on variables in the
program at specific program points. Each invariant is for a single variable
and represents the set of values of the variable in the observed executions.
Due to the simple form of the invariants, they do not track the dependence
of the variable on other variables or program paths. PRECIS invariants, on
the other hand, summarize the higher-level relationships between outputs,
inputs and program paths.
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5.1.2 Daikon
The Daikon tool [14] discovers invariants by analyzing program execution
traces. At function entry/exit points and other specified program points,
Daikon instantiates a set of invariant templates such as comparison with
constant value, linear relationships, ordering, etc. For each template, dif-
ferent combinations of variables including function parameters, return values
are tried. Corresponding invariants are reported if they hold for all execution
traces.
The main advantage of PRECIS over Daikon is that it employs predicate
word information to guide the analysis of execution traces. As a result,
PRECIS is able to discover path-specific invariants not inferred by Daikon.
Although the CreateSpinfo utility in Daikon has some support for using
program predicates to generate conditional invariants, it is not able to com-
bine the predicates to encode program paths and therefore does not generate
such invariants with complex path conditions.
Daikon includes some complex invariant templates such as membership
(e.g. x∈ {0, 1, 3}) and sortedness, not supported by PRECIS currently.
However, we believe that our program path based clustering method can
be extended to consider additional templates such as these.
5.1.3 DySy
DySy [17] introduces dynamic symbolic execution in order to infer function
preconditions and postconditions. DySy executes test cases and simultane-
ously also performs symbolic execution of the program. The program path
followed is recorded as a symbolic expression which gets refined with execu-
tion of the set of tests. The resulting invariants express output as a function
of inputs conditioned on the program path.
Although PRECIS generates invariants similar in form to those of DySy,
it does it without symbolic execution. Program paths are tracked with
lightweight instrumentation of branch conditions. As a result, it has much
less overhead and does not require dealing with typical issues with symbolic
approaches such as handling floating point numbers.
DySy simplifies the path conditions using symbolic engines before present-
ing the invariants to the user, which is not possible with PRECIS. However
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the predicate words present in PRECIS invariants provide a direct mapping
to the program paths the invariant covers which can be useful to the user.
5.1.4 Krystal
Krystal [18] generates data structure invariants through a variant of symbolic
execution called universal symbolic execution, which is argued to be more
powerful in deriving complex invariants over heaps. Since PRECIS defines an
input corresponding to each heap modification, it can also generate invariants
that capture dependence of output on heap modifications.
5.1.5 Statistical debugging
Statistical Debugging is a dynamic technique that employs predicates ex-
tracted from branch conditions in the program, wherein the predicates are
used in a very different context than in bug predictors [39, 40, 41]. These
techniques analyze the correlation of predicate values to the success or failure
of a program run and evaluate the utility of predicates for bug localization.
PRECIS employs predicates to encode program paths for the purpose of
generating invariants. In [40], predicates are clustered for localizing multi-
ple bugs. It should be noted that unlike this approach, PRECIS clusters
predicate words that encode program paths and not predicates themselves.
5.2 Fault Detection
When deciding which invariant generation technique to use for detectors,
the two broad categories of existing approaches are static and dynamic tech-
niques. Static approaches [1, 2, 3] generate concise and correct invariants,
but have scalability issues for real-world programs. Dynamic approaches like
Daikon and DIDUCE [14, 15] are more scalable and modular than static or
symbolic approaches. However, many of the generated invariants can be spu-
rious, since a property may hold for the gathered training data but not for
all valid executions. In addition, these techniques generate a large quantity
of invariants on relatively trivial relationships. Both of these factors make
automatic integration of the generated invariants into code difficult.
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The work of Pattabiraman et al., “Automated Derivation of Application-
Specific Error Detectors Using Dynamic Analysis” [29] has a similar approach
to our work. Both methodologies involve generating some set of assertions
during a training phase and using these as a means of error detection.
A significant difference, however, is in type of assertions generated. Pat-
tabiraman et al. is very similar to Daikon [14] in that there are predefined
generic “rule classes,” similar to Daikon’s templates. This means it suffers
the same problems as Daikon: the high number of false positives and the
large amount of low-quality invariants. These shortcomings are especially
troublesome in an error detector, because false positives can mean necessary
interruption and re-execution of critical software.
Furthermore, since the rule classes from which the assertions are generated
are fixed, they cannot adapt to the specifics of the target application. Instead,
they must be sufficiently broad so that they are applicable in a wide range
of use cases. For example, one rule class generated by the method in [29] is
x > y. In this case, rather than checking what the value of x or y should
be, an assertion is effectively checking what the value should not be. This
contributes to the false positive problem discussed earlier; since the assertion
generated is broad, an incorrect one may not be invalidated in a limited
number of executions. In addition, this means that the assertions are less
useful as error detectors; the broader the assertion, the more likely that an
error will not be detected by it.
In contrast, the assertions generated by our technique are succinct yet
expressive. Instead of requiring behavior to fall into one of the predefined
rule classes, we capture expected program behavior in terms specific to the
program itself. Rather than attempting to generate an assertion that cap-
tures all behavior of a variable, capturing program path information allows
us to consider only a single straight-line execution through the program at
a time. Since these straight-line executions are much simpler than the total
behavior of the program, this allows the generated assertion to be much more
strict than an assertion that singlehandedly attempts to cover all executions.
And since we simultaneously merge the models constructed for a single path
through predicate clustering, we can narrow down the behavior to the min-
imal set of such assertions that describe program behavior. This leads to a
low false positive rate, and high coverage per assertion.
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5.2.1 Tightness
We can quantitatively examine the degree to which our generated assertions
more specific through the measure of tightness introduced in [29]. In that
work, tightness is used as a means to predict which assertion of multiple
candidates will be most likely to detect an error.
Tightness is not a mathematically sound measure of the coverage of an
invariant; the following analysis makes assumptions that may not be true in
real-world code. However, we use the same set of assumptions as in [29] to
show how the format of invariants generated by PRECIS are quantitatively
higher quality by the same metric as used in the previous work.
To make our analysis general, we will make the following assumptions
about the nature of errors and detectors:
• The distribution of errors is uniform throughout the set of N possible
values for any given variable.
• Variables are independent; an error in a variable does not affect the
likelihood of an error in other variables.
• Detectors are independent; the distribution of other detectors in code
does not affect the likelihood of an error occurring at any other detector.
• An error is equally likely to occur on any single program path, and that
all generated invariants have the same likelihood of detecting an error
in their output variables.
If we define tightness as (1− P (Inv)), where P (Inv) is the probability of
an error in output O being caught by invariant I which describes that output
under the program path being executed, we can write an expression for the
tightness of the invariants our technique generates:
P (Inv) = P (Ante) ∗ P (Cons|Ante)
+(1− P (Ante)) ∗ P (Covered|¬Ante) ∗ P (Cons|Ante)
where:
• P (Ante) is the probability that the antecedent in the invariant expres-
sion will be evaluated correctly (to true) with an incorrect value.
• P (Cons|Ante) is the probability the evaluated consequent will detect
the error given the antecedent is evaluated correctly.
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• P (Covered|¬Ante) is the probability there is another invariant on out-
put O whose antecedent (incorrectly) evaluates to true given the incor-
rect value.
More fundamentally, we can think of this equation as expressing a series
of contingencies for catching the error. The most likely way to catch an error
is if we can correctly detect which program path was traversed, and evaluate
the consequent for that path on the corresponding output variable. Since the
antecedent and consequent check for a strict linear equation, the likelihood
of an error being detected is (N − 1)/N , since any different value than the
expected output will be flagged.
However, it is possible that the antecedent is not evaluated correctly due
to the error. In this case, the antecedent expression may evaluate to another
program path, or may not be covered at all. The likelihood that it evaluates
to another program path given our assumptions is the control-flow coverage
of our output variable. In this analysis, we will conservatively assume this
to be 1/2. Experimental results show this number to be much higher. In
this case, the probability of detecting the error is the probability that the
consequent of this incorrectly applied invariant happens to evaluate is again
(N − 1)/N .
Thus, if we evaluate the P (Inv) expression with these parameters, we find
that P (Inv) = (N − 1)2/N2 + (1 − (N − 1)/N) ∗ (N − 1)/2N , which is
considerably tighter than the bounded range rule used in the example in
[29].
5.3 Bug Localization
To our knowledge, no previous technique proposes the combination of bug
localization and invariant generation for improved software reliability as we
do in this thesis with PREAMBL and PRECIS. However, both automatic
invariant generation and bug localization are active topics of research with a
number of related works.
The two main categories of automatic invariant generation tools are static
[17, 18] and dynamic [14, 15, 30] analysis. DySy combines these approaches
to generate invariants similar in form to those generated by PRECIS. DySy
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performs a concurrent dynamic and symbolic executions of the target pro-
gram, keeping track of the symbolic value of each variable during execution.
These are used to construct an expression for each output during the given
execution. This expression is considered to be an invariant for a given path,
and the conjunction of all observed paths is the derived output invariant.
Static or symbolic approaches like DySy work well for small, self-contained
programs but often have difficulty scaling to real-world applications. To re-
duce overhead, PRECIS can be applied to some subset of functions in the
program. However, by their nature static approaches will need to build a
model of the entire program, which may prove infeasible for large applica-
tions. A related concern is the use of binary libraries. Because a source-level
implementation of the library may not be available, a model for its behavior
cannot be statically derived and it cannot be symbolically executed.
Another approach to invariant generation is dynamic analysis of program
executions. The Daikon tool instruments a target program to capture the
values of variables during execution [14]. Invariants are generated by at-
tempting to apply templates – common unary, binary, or ternary relations
– to each single, pair, or triple of instrumented variables. In practice, the
invariants generated by Daikon can be unspecific, in that they define accept-
able ranges for values or what a value should not be, rather than finding an
expression of what the value should be. This is because Daikon invariants
attempt to capture behavior for all executions through the function. In con-
trast, since PRECIS invariants are path-specific, they can be simultaneously
more specific and still cover a large proportion of function executions. In
addition, Daikon often suffers from generating too many invariants – a typ-
ical function can have 20 or more generated invariants, some of which may
be spurious and others which check trivial properties. This makes automat-
ically checking the invariants infeasible, and requires manual effort from the
developer to browse through the generated invariants and decide which are
of interest.
DIDUCE is another dynamic approach that is instead designed for online
anomaly detection [15]. For each variable of interest, it generates an invariant
in the form of a bit-string mask representing the valid values for each bit in
the binary representation of the variable. This mask is gradually loosened
during the training phase to be as restrictive as possible while still allowing
all observed values. During online execution, this mask invariant will trigger
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when a bit-string not covered by the mask is observed. DIDUCE has been
shown effective at detecting latent bugs. A downside is the invariants it
generates are not very intuitive for humans, as they describe a valid bit-
string for each variable.
We find that PRECIS is the invariant generation technique best suited for
bug localization for a number of reasons. It uses dynamic analysis, and so
scales better for large applications or those which use binary libraries. It
generates a relatively small number of high-quality invariants, which makes
automatic integration into code more feasible. These invariants are intuitive
for humans to understand, so they are likely to help developers diagnose bugs.
Furthermore, since these invariants are path-specific, they can be combined
with a path-based bug localization technique to capture behavior specifi-
cally on problematic program paths. To our knowledge, no other invariant
generation techniques can claim all of these advantages.
Early statistical bug localization techniques analyzed the correlation be-
tween predicates and failing runs [19, 41]. In these works predicates refer
a Boolean expression that is inserted into program code, rather than the
specific control-flow oriented meaning used by PRECIS. In particular, [19] is
closely related to PREAMBL. Both tools use the same scoring metrics, but
in PREAMBL it is applied to path profiles, while CBI to predicate profiles.
A more recent work by Chilimbi et al., HOLMES, proposed the use of path
profiling to capture more information about failing runs while using less
overhead [21]. HOLMES targets single-procedure, acyclic paths. For each ex-
ecution, it identifies whether or not a given path was observed or executed.
It then scores and ranks paths based on the same Sensitivity, Increase, and
Importance metrics as CBI.
PREAMBL shares many similarities with HOLMES. Both localize bugs to
specific path profiles, and both use the same scoring metrics proposed by [19].
However, PREAMBL localizes to variable-length, interprocedural paths. This
allows for improved quality of localization: since PREAMBL selects the paths
with maximal Increase scores, predicates that are not relevant to the bug are
naturally not included in the localized path. Further, multi-procedure paths
lead to better detection of bugs which result from interactions between pro-
cedures.
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5.4 Regression Testing
The vast majority of both research and practice in detecting regressions is
through the technique of regression testing. Regression testing involves main-
taining a set of program test input and expected output values such that re-
gressions are detected by a discrepancy in the output value. The problem of
selecting, prioritizing, and minimizing regression tests has been approached
in various contexts [42, 43, 44, 45, 46]. The work presented in this thesis is
orthogonal to this body of work in that it captures relationships (invariants)
between intermediate variables in the program in addition to the program
input and output relationships captured by a typical regression test.
Regression testing based on value spectra [47] proposes capturing relation-
ships between program states and entry and exit of functions (value spectra)
in addition to the relationship between program inputs and outputs. Do-
main specific invariants to create regression tests have been proposed for
web applications using Javascript and Ajax [48, 49].
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CHAPTER 6
PRECIS IMPLEMENTATION
The goal of PRECIS implementation was to create a fully automated system
to perform all steps of the PRECIS methodology, from program instrumen-
tation, to data collection, to invariant generation, and to integration of those
invariants into code for runtime checking. The following sections describe
the implementation work that went into creating the PRECIS tool.
6.1 Program Instrumentation
The program instrumentation phase involves capturing all the inputs, pred-
icates, and outputs relevant to PRECIS. This is nontrivial, for a number of
reasons:
Prior work in instrumenting Daikon indicated that a static, source-to-
source transformation for the instrumentation of the desired variables would
be problematic for larger programs. Their tool, dfec, was developed as
an extension to a C/C++ front end [50]. It works by instrumenting the
entry and exit points of functions with statements which evaluate input and
output values, and print them to a trace data file. dfec worked for smaller,
simpler programs but quickly ran into issues when dealing with complex
program constructs. Specifically, the instrumentation code needed to be
added at every possible function exit, and for each input or output null-
checking statements needed to be added, possibly multiple in the case of
multi-level pointers or structs.
Ultimately, these problems spurred Daikon to move to a dynamic instru-
mentation framework, Fjalar [32]. Fjalar is based on Valgrind [33], a well-
known tool for the dynamic inspection of program state. Valgrind runs in a
context enclosing the executing program while remaining in the same mem-
ory space. This allows for easy programmatic access to program state, in
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Daikon’s case the input and output variables. For example, hooks can be
made such that Fjalar code is called whenever the executing program enters
or exits a function. However, as Daikon is a C/C++ source level tool, it
needs more information to identify the names and locations of source-level
variables. Thus, the program is compiled with the GDWARF-2 standard
debugging format. This information is read by Fjalar, and parsed to identify
the stack memory offsets of the variables of interest. These offsets can then
be queried during runtime to capture the desired variable values.
As Fjalar is a dynamic instrumentation approach, it proved to be more
versatile than dfec. Much larger programs could be handled, including those
with irregular control flow structure such as goto and longjmp statements.
To make use of the existing work that has been done in dynamic instru-
mentation of program state for the purpose of invariant generation, we build
the PRECIS instrumentation tool on top of Fjalar as a plug-in. However,
the program state information provided by Fjalar proved less than required
for PRECIS for the following reasons:
First, each run of a function may have a different number of inputs and
outputs, and so the instrumentation process must be able to dynamically
adjust for that fact. Inputs and outputs can vary between runs for a number
of reasons: input declarations might not be reached in some executions,
certain inputs may be NULL during executions, and certain heap address
locations may or may not be written during other executions. Thus, null-
checking had to be integrated into the variable capture code.
Second, the value of predicates (control flow branches) is not easily avail-
able in a binary, even when compiled with debugging flags. This makes
counting and instrumenting a function’s predicates difficult.
Third, the presence of loops and structure of loops is also not readily
available for analysis in a binary. This makes handling loops in the manner
described by the PRECIS methodology difficult.
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#ifndef PRECIS_LOOP_FUNC_HEADER
#define PRECIS_LOOP_FUNC_HEADER 1
void precis_loop_test(int io, int loop_num){}
#endif
#ifndef PRECIS_PREDICATE_FUNC_HEADER
#define PRECIS_PREDICATE_FUNC_HEADER 1
int precis_pred_test(int var, int p_num){return var;}
#endif
...
if (precis_pred_test(if_cond, 0)){
...
}
while (loop_cond) {
precis_loop_test(0,0);
...
precis_loop_test(1,0);
}
Figure 6.1: Example source file test.c after initial source-to-source
transformation.
To address the second and third concerns, an initial source-to-source trans-
formation had to be performed to in effect trigger the existing hooks available
in Fjalar. This transformation does not intrinsically add any instrumenta-
tion. However, a dummy function is defined for predicates and for each loop.
The dummy predicate function is called with the evaluated result of that
predicate, and the unique predicate number corresponding to the predicate.
A loop is instrumented with at least two dummy loop function calls: one at
the start of the loop and one at each possible exit. Each such call passes 0 or
1 depending on whether the loop is being entered or exited, and the unique
number of the loop in the program.
Figure 6.1 shows an example transformed source file. When the program
is executing, precis pred test will be called whenever a predicate is eval-
uated. PRECIS is called during each function entrance; in this case it reads
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and saves the formal parameters as the value and number of the predicate,
respectively. Similarly, when precis loop test is called with io=0, the con-
text of the calling function (which is the next function on the stack) is noted.
Loop inputs are captured. Then, when it is called at the end of a loop, the
loop outputs are captured. Any predicates encountered in between are saved
in the context of the loop, not the surrounding function.
6.2 Trace Data Format
Figure 6.2 shows the CSV trace data format outputted by Fjalar and used
by the PredicateClustering tool. It encodes the variable names of each input,
predicate, and output, along with all observed values. Each line represents
a single execution of that function. Values that were not observed during a
given execution are encoded with an INVALID value.
<function_name>:
i,i,...,i,p,p,...,p,o,o,...,o
<i0_name>,..,<iN_name>, p<p_N1>,..,p<p_NN>,<o0_name>,..,<oN_name>
<i0_val>,..,<iN_val>,<p_V1>,..,p<p_VN>,<o0_val>,..,<oN_val>
<i0_val>,..,<iN_val>,<p_V1>,..,p<p_VN>,<o0_val>,..,<oN_val>
[Repeated for all lines of trace data]
Figure 6.2: Generated trace data CSV format.
6.3 Predicate Clustering
Predicate clustering is performed by the PredicateClustering tool, a pro-
gram written in Java. PredicateClustering reads in the CSV trace data file
shown in Figure 6.2. It then performs the steps of predicate grouping, seed
cluster generation, and invariant generation discussed in Chapter 2. The end
result is a set of generated invariants, which can be exported in a human-
readable format for programmer review, or a machine-readable format as
shown in Figure 6.3.
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6.4 Invariant Format
Figure 6.3 shows the format of machine-readable invariants generated by
the PredicateClustering tool. The header of the file contains informa-
tion about the function name, the input variable names, and the predicate
numbers. Following this is a set of outputs. Each output contains a list of
predicate word to output function mappings. The predicate word is simply a
list of values (1, 0, or X), depending of the observed value of the predicate in
that position. The mapping from predicate positions to predicate numbers
is indicated in the header: the first predicate number on the third line of the
header corresponds to the first shown value in the predicate word, and so on.
The input vector is a list of coefficients corresponding to the linear output
function. The mapping between coefficients and variable names is the same
as the second line of the header, except that the input vector has one more
coefficient, corresponding to a constant offset.
<function_name>: <--
<input0_name>,<input1_name>,...,<inputN_name> <-- Header
p<p_Num1>,p<p_Num2>,...,p<p_NumN> <--
<output0_name>{
<pWord0>:[input vector]
.
.
.
}
<output1_name>{
...
}
...
Figure 6.3: Generated invariant machine-readable format.
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6.5 Automated Assertion Integration and Checking
Automatic invariant integration is done through the PRECIS plug-in to
Fjalar. Once the machine-readable invariant format shown in Figure 6.3
is produced, it can be passed into Fjalar with the --check-invariants
command-line argument. This will in effect use the same instrumentation
process as was used in generating the trace data file, except instead of gen-
erating the file will check the observed output values against the encoded
invariants. This is done by gathering the inputs listed in the invariant file
and computing an expected output based on the output function for the pred-
icate word observed. If the observed output and expected output match, the
assertion passes. Else, the assertion fails and the program exits.
6.6 Fault Injection Framework
The PRECIS plug-in to Fjalar has also been extended to inject faults into
running programs, specifically for the work discussed in Chapter 3. Fjalar is
a naturally intuitive place to put fault injection for several reasons. First, it
provides easy access to program state. Given that this is done dynamically,
it is not very difficult to simply change the value stored at a given address,
rather than capture it as is done in the PRECIS flow.
However, instead of dividing observed variables into inputs and outputs,
all program state is considered as a candidate for injection. This includes
local variables, heap variables, and other variables not typically captured for
PRECIS. A minor extension to Fjalar was required to be able to access and
modify this program state.
86
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
7.1 Lessons Learned
The following is a list of some lessons learned in the time spent developing
the techniques discussed in this thesis:
• Path information is an intuitive way to divide a program’s
behavior. Isolating the behavior of a single program path is in effect
separating the “when” (the path condition) from the “what” (the end
result) in the behavior of the program. The forward direction – given
a path, what should the behavior be? – is intuitive as a way to struc-
ture invariants as generated by PRECIS. The backward direction also
proved useful – given some behavior, what is the program path associ-
ated with it? This reverse relationship is used in PREAMBL to localize
program misbehavior to certain program paths.
• Building a tool to automate PRECIS is nontrivial. A compiled
C/C++ program does not lend itself easily to source-level analysis.
Once a program is compiled, most to all source level information such
as variable names, if statement conditions, and loop structure is lost.
Programs compiled with debugging flags retain some of that informa-
tion, but not all. Thus, a source-to-source transformation must be
performed first to trigger events that could be observed by a dynamic
instrumentation tool. In this, Valgrind and Fjalar proved invaluable as
they provided a way to examine the contents of program state from an
enclosing state. This increased overhead, but provided a way for much
simpler, relatively speaking, instrumentation.
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7.2 Future Work
There is a great deal of future work possible to extend the techniques dis-
cussed in this thesis.
An important step in linking the regression testing and bug localization
phases of software development is an automatic way to associate localized
paths derived by PREAMBL with invariants generated by PRECIS. At
present, paths are associated with invariants by human inspection. However,
given large programs this would be impractical. A relatively simple addition
to PREAMBL would be a way of reading in the invariant format generated
by PRECIS and reporting the associated invariants in user-readable terms.
This will greatly improve the relevance of the localized paths by associating
them with some behavior.
7.3 Final Thoughts
This thesis explored the idea of automatically generating program invariants
and applying them to research areas across the field of software engineering.
PRECIS is an invariant generation technique that uses predicate data in
combination with a linear regression combination to derive function-level
invariants. The three-step process of data generation, predicate clustering,
and invariant generation generates high-specificity, high-coverage, and high-
quality invariants.
The invariants generated by PRECIS can be used to detect hardware
faults. The invariants can be integrated into program text for software-level
checking, or used on specialized hardware for low overhead. Fault injection
experiments show that these invariants have high-coverage for a several types
of manifested errors.
The same predicate information gathered by PRECIS can also be used
for bug localization. PREAMBL localizes bugs to variable-length interpro-
cedural paths through a statistical path-scoring algorithm. This process is
optimized through the use of a path-tree data structure. These localized
paths can then be associated with invariants to improve the software debug-
ging process.
A major theme of this thesis is the use of existing code to improve the
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software development process. Past approaches to static invariant genera-
tion have shortcomings due to the path-explosion problem, while dynamic
approaches have remained too general and unspecific. This thesis explores
an answer to these problems by using path information (in the form of pred-
icates). Program path predicates provide a unique “fingerprint” for each ex-
ecution, which “filters” the specific behavior for that particular path. Since
each individual path tends to have relatively simple behavior, this allows for
the piecemeal analysis of each path individually. These analyses can then be
recombined to form a model for the entire program.
This thesis has shown the promise of predicate-based automatically gener-
ated invariants for improvements in regression testing, bug localization, and
fault detection. Continuing with a similar approach holds promise for even
greater improvements in those areas, as well as new applications in other
challenging areas of software development.
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APPENDIX A
GETTING PRECIS AND PREAMBL
PRECIS and PREAMBL are available on an University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign wiki page. Documentation on how to use the tools is included.
For more details, go to:
https://wiki.engr.illinois.edu/display/precis/.
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